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Abstract.  
Blockchain technology provides a distributed ledger and is based on a logic of peer to 
peer authentication. It gained prominence with the rise of cryptocurrencies but provides a 
much broader field of possible application, including – but not limited to – land and other 
registries, global trade systems. While it has been originally closely linked to a libertarian, 
anarchic agenda, recent developments of commercial applications have illustrated that it can 
been dissociated from a particular ideological framing. The purpose of our paper is to identify 
and classify core properties of blockchain as an organizational technology and related modes 
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of blockchain governance. We do this by looking at a number of case studies which highlight 
a number of governance design issues as well as unintended effects of the technology and 
related design choices. We are exploring the linkages between blockchain application 
properties and related design options and choices. 
 
Extended abstract. 
Blockchain arose from the intention of creating native digital currencies. It originated 
online like many Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) projects: with an idea shared 
publicly and early prototypes developed by volunteers. Despite its origin, blockchains escape 
the main tenets of current theories about online organizing. So, we need to take a step back 
and look at those conceptualizations. 
Information infrastructures opened up for a very successful mode of organizing, which 
is well-exemplified by FOSS and Wikipedia. This mode of governance has been labeled 
‘bazaar’ and relies upon nearly zero marginal cost of reproduction and distribution of 
information goods, which are -as a consequence- ‘non-exclusive’ (i.e. one’s use does not 
exclude anyone else’s). The bazaar’s peculiarities lay in its mode of production, usually 
referred to as ‘commons-based peer production’ (CBPP), and the prominence of free 
participation and reputation above other rewarding mechanisms. 
The radical openness that this mode of governance exploits in practice and celebrates 
in theory questioned copyright and the mode of production and distribution it entails. So, it 
originated disruptions in a number of industries, starting with music. Despite the democratic 
allure of those stances, it has to be noted that they provided advantages to the emergence of 
the contemporary IT oligopoly to the extent it relies on free access to software and data and 
re-organized software developers’ work (Parker, Van Alstyne, & Jiang, 2016).  
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Against this background, our research problem is that the ‘bazaar’ does not explain 
essential peculiarities of blockchain as an organizational technology. More specifically, 
blockchains authenticate each item from all its copies, which are not all the same any more. 
Thus, each item is unique, therefore ‘exclusive’ (i.e. one’s use prevents others’). Blockchains 
achieve that through distributed consensus, which needs cooperation of the majority of 
participants and generates scarcity of the items it authenticates. In turn, scarcity triggers 
rivalry between actors longing for a limited number of tokens. The consequences of this 
peculiar arrangement are evident by considering the consequences of forking a blockchain. 
The new ‘forked’ ledger may use the same software, but the authenticity and value of the 
items it records are not the same. 
Even though they are far from disappearing, permissionless blockchains have been 
battered by substantial governance problems. The need for more effective governance tools 
can take the shape of more sophisticated blockchains that predefine the rules of future 
changes. An alternative, which is discussed here, is letting consortia-based blockchains to 
retain some ad-hoc decision-making powers to cope with the inevitable unpredictability of 
future situations. This mode of governance differs from the bazaar without falling back into 
existing idealtypes of governance like market, hierarchy, or network. Hanseatic governance is 
characterized, we argue, by: 
a) partial delegation of typical organizational functions like consensus and 
authentication to technology, 
b) need to anticipate and negotiate early on in the consortium building and 
development process the known, and possibly unknown, scenarios ahead of the 
initiative, 
c) traceability and reliability of the records, especially when they exceed specific 
organizational domain or jurisdiction. 
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1. Introduction 
Destroying a hard disk is not the same as burning money. Files can be copied back 
easily, money does not have backup copies. Online, all data used to be the same, there is no 
inherent difference between original and copy. Since reproduction and distribution of 
information goods have nearly zero marginal cost, scarcity of data has been a non-issue. In 
other words, information goods are non-exclusive, one’s use does not exclude everyone 
else’s. This is a root cause of both major transformations of industries, starting with music, 
and novel organizational forms like Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and Wikipedia. 
The inherent difficulty of containing data replication and distribution made information 
technologies effective in reducing transaction cost, but also ill-suited to provide money, which 
must be non-counterfeitable (thus inherently exclusive), without an external guarantor. Over 
the decades, especially in the domain of ‘Digital Rights Management’, attempts to re-
introduce authentication into digital environments have been pursued through chips, digital 
certificates of different sorts, and designated organizations issuing and guaranteeing them. 
While those efforts have been useful for formal organizations adopting IT and fencing their 
digital networks, not least because they have to rely on recognized legal entities, the internet 
remained the realm of abundant and uncertified data. The novelty introduced in this domain 
by blockchain is the distributed mode of authentication vis-a-vis certification authorities with 
own mechanisms of accreditation and auditing. So, one may see webpages (or remixes on 
YouTube) at one extreme of the spectrum of freedom, Wikipedia as an instance to distributed 
and moderated content production. FOSS is more stringent, at the very least because it has to 
run, blockchains can be placed at the opposite extreme of webpages to the extend their tokens 
are authenticated. In other terms, we see a gray scale that covers from pure information goods 
all the way to transaction records. 
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The blockchain circumvents non-exclusivity of information goods and brings 
exclusivity and scarcity via native authentication into the digital environment. It proved 
digital scarcity viable by making transactions public and by letting the 51% of computing 
power (there are alternatives) authenticate transactions through a hashing algorithm (Bitcoin 
uses SHA-256) run by so-called miners. This means that a blockchain provides a unique and 
immutable ledger whose integrity is protected by a combination of technical and governance 
designs. Those ledgers locate each and every item and differentiate it from any other at any 
point in time. So, they can record transactions (of financial exchanges or supply chains, for 
example) or registries (vehicle records and cadasters are considered in this article). In 
practice, it makes no sense to copy items out of the blockchain that authenticates their 
validity. It would be like handwriting ‘100 Euros’ on a piece of paper hoping to buy 
something with it.  
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin proved at scale blockchain functionalities, which 
introduce non-replicability into digital environments through distributed authentication. The 
organizational counterpart of authenticity is both cooperation to keep the system as a whole 
running reliably, and rivalry between actors longing for a finite number of tokens or 
authenticated records. The capacity of authentication, defined by consensus algorithms and 
sealed continuously by miners, is relevant for governance purposes because it introduces a 
sense of togetherness due to shared interest. This is different from other information goods 
(like music or software) and the peculiar ‘bazaar’ governance (Raymond, 1999) (Demil & 
Lecocq, 2006) that they brought about through recent decades. Thus, since blockchains 
embed organizational functions like consensus and authentication, they can be seen as an 
instance of organizational technologies as distinct from other information technologies 
deployed for organizational purposes.  
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Against this background, identifying the features of this emerging mode of 
governance, which we later discuss as ‘Hanseatic’, is the overall objective of this paper. After 
presenting cases from the blockchain domain, we discuss them proposing the analogy to the 
Hanseatic League, which dominated trades and governance in Northern Europe for centuries. 
It was a confederation of fairly independent cities when nation-states had not consolidated 
yet; it was driven by guilds and aimed at facilitating and defending trade through alliances 
before the Rule of Law became hegemonic across Europe. In short, we place our interest in 
governance and distributed ledgers against the broader background of changing relations 
between formal organizations and large information systems (information infrastructures), 
and we argue that the analogy of a mode of governance that predated modern states captures 
relevant aspects that pass unseen adopting existing conceptualizations. Narrowing it down to 
an exploratory research question, our focus is on: How is blockchain governance different 
from the governance of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS), often referred to as ‘bazaar’? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we define our theoretical 
background in relation to FOSS, its bazaar mode of governance and commons-based peer 
production (CBPP). Then, we highlight why native authentication brings something new and 
relevant to the digital environment. The paper continues by describing the research methods 
used for different empirical cases considered. These are, firstly, the Bitcoin scaling and the 
Decentralized Autonomous Organization’s (DAO) governance problems. Secondly, two cases 
of coalition-based blockchains are examined: a distributed ledger to address information 
asymmetry in the second-hand car market and land registries. Those cases are then analyzed 
regarding their applicability to the cornerstones of ‘Hanseatic governance’, which is then 
discussed against established modes of governance. 
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2. Literature review 
Since design and practice often differ substantially (Ciborra, 2000), we searched for 
literature about blockchain, organization, and governance with a specific interest for 
blockchains in actual use, rather than for publications outlining the potentials of this new 
architecture. Empirical studies remain sparse, so our selection criterion left us with a 
relatively small number of works to consider: not least because of the long-time cycle of 
implementing IT, studying them, and going through peer-review processes, we could not find 
much academic literature based on studies of actually implemented and blockchains used in 
real-life settings. Consequently, despite our keen intention of differentiating between 
speculations about the potentials of blockchain and actual uses, it was often difficult to 
discriminate between what was aimed at by designers and researchers from what was 
happening in practice (Grover, Kar, & Ilavarasan, 2018). 
In recent years, Bitcoin first and blockchains later have attracted wide-spread interest 
(Swan, 2015). Computer scientists have been first movers to approach this emerging 
phenomenon and proposed many variants of the architecture concept outlined originally by 
Nakamoto (2008). Nakamoto’s problem for creating a purely digital currency was enabling 
unique identifiers, like the URL for example, without relying on any organization, like the 
ICANN. Solving this problem would have allowed a peer-to-peer cash system out of the 
‘protection’ of formal organizations, which were seen as enemies in the cyberlibertarian 
culture where it originated. 
It has to be noted that rights-protected information goods have been an area of 
research and economic interest at least since copyright became an issue. For what concerns 
digital goods, digital certificates were tried. They were always managed by certifying 
organizations in charge of their accreditation and auditing. Sometimes, certificates were 
paired to microchips soldered directly into the hardware. Implementing and enforcing these 
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mechanisms has repeatedly proven precarious because of technical, organizational, and even 
legal vulnerabilities. Those initiatives and research lines are only marginally considered here 
because crypto-currencies and blockchains come from a different context. Nonetheless, their 
distributed mode of authentication might end up in having an effect where other initiatives 
failed.  
We proceeded as follows. Scientific publications, practitioner’s reports, and the 
interview data were fed into an iterative sense-making process: the authors coded and 
conceptualized the information individually. Codes were initially seeded by using concepts 
characterizing established governance mechanisms. These individually gathered insights were 
then discussed by all authors. We also exposed immediate results and sought for input from 
the Coding Value research project. This input was then used to revisit the data and further 
develop our concepts. This iterative approach was finished when theoretical saturation was 
reached.  
To date, Morabito (2017) offers the most exhaustive overview of the state-of-the-art of 
blockchain in organizations. The salient applications presented therein are Coinbase, 
Everledger, Factom, eHealth, electricity management, and finance. Those cases were useful 
for us navigating and putting into perspective materials about the actual implementations we 
found, and to decide what to concentrate on empirically. Interestingly, the blockchain 
architecture is believed to fit into widely diverse domains in terms of scope or transactional 
volume: from land registries to supply chain management systems, from intellectual property 
right management to money transfers and payments. In all those domains, the incumbents are 
intermediaries or third-party guarantors, which the blockchains aim at substituting. Overall, 
Morabito (2017) warns about the risks of privatizing state functions through blockchains as 
they contribute to “a process of undermining public institutions, the superiority of economics 
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over politics, and the change of citizens into customers (…), which perpetually empowers 
markets to the disadvantage of citizens”, which is in line with Atzori (2015). 
Walsh et al. (2016) conducted a literature review to gain an overview of blockchain 
characteristics, a necessary step to define blockchain types. Key blockchain characteristics 
are: level of permission, restriction of public access to data, modes of consensus, modularity, 
scalability, interoperability, and anonymity. Four possible and distinctive types emerge: 
Decentralized/Extensible (Bitcoin), Decentralized/Inextensible (Counterparty), 
Centralized/Extensible (Ripple), and Centralized/Inextensible (R3). Empirical investigation is 
expected to uncover a number of operational issues associated with different types, e.g. issues 
of governance, political aspirations, control, risk and resistance to change from those 
continuing to use traditional systems. Scholz and Stein (2018) foreground the organizational 
aspect of blockchain and aim at showing specific novelties in comparison to other types of 
organizations. 
We grouped other contributions according to their focus on public services or private 
sector. From the former, a case study in healthcare by Ekblaw, Azaria, Halamka, and 
Lippman (2016) analyze MedRec, a system that gives patients a comprehensive, immutable 
log and easy access to their medical information across providers and treatment sites. 
Leveraging a blockchain, MedRec manages authentication, confidentiality, accountability, 
and data sharing, all of which are crucial considerations when handling health data. In the 
private sector, the most developed domain appears to remain finance, not least because of the 
investors and general public’s attention that cryptocurrencies attracted. Morisse (2015) 
surveys 42 papers about cryptocurrencies in terms of methods, concepts, and approaches and 
finds that cryptocurrencies had not reached IS research, at least in 2015. The work by Du, 
Pan, Leidner, and Ying (2018) is particularly interesting for their attempt to conceptualize the 
differences between the affordances that blockchain offers and what actually happens during a 
Miscione, Goerke, Klein, Schwabe, Ziolkowski 
10 
blockchain implementation in a FinTech context. Studies on security were also receptive of 
this emerging phenomenon. Herbert and Litchfield (2015) research the application of property 
rights in the case of blockchain-based software piracy prevention. Karame, Androulaki, 
Roeschlin, Gervais, and Čapkun (2015) analyze the probability of double-spending on the 
Bitcoin blockchain and claim that the current Bitcoin log does not provide sufficient 
information to provide satisfactory accountability, which would facilitate to blacklist 
malicious nodes.  
3. Theoretical framework 
This section is articulated in three parts. After an outline of IT governance, the 
‘bazaar’ mode of governance is detailed together with its peculiar mode of production, called 
Commons-based-peer-production. Despite their common origin, blockchain cases present a 
different governance mode because authenticity is central and miners and users have a heavier 
influence on constraining software developers’ freedom.  
The unconstrained data abundance that information infrastructures provide has been 
disrupting industries for several years. Internet companies not older than 20 years like Google 
and Amazon have taken center stage and become IT multinationals with the greatest 
capitalizations and societal impact. More central here is that open information infrastructures 
originated new organizational forms that Raymond (1999) first, and Demil and Lecocq (2006) 
later, labelled ‘bazaar’.1 Rather than formal organizations, referred to as ‘cathedrals’, online 
                                                          
1 Regarding terminology, this article uses ‘form of organization’ and ‘mode of governance’ interchangeably. This is not only due to the 
literature of reference, which oscillate between the two terms (Demil & Lecocq, 2006; W. Powell, 2003), but also to our broad understanding 
of organizing, which underpins both. Following Czarniawska (2014), we understand organizing as a process that is broader than 
organizations, which are a relatively structured and stable way of organizing.  
Regarding the concept of power, to which governance is clearly related, we understand it as the ability to get others to behave as they would 
not. This definition allows to see power also where no direct command and control can be exercised. This relational definition of power 
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organizing resembles a bazaar, where atomized individuals organize on the basis of merit and 
reputation. David D. Clark, an early internet architect, captured this mode of governance with 
a slogan that has become famous: “We reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: 
rough consensus and running code.” Remarkable successes of this form of organizing, also 
referred to as ‘commons-based peer production’ (CBPP) (Y. Benkler, 2006) originated FOSS 
(Coleman, 2012) and Wikipedia (Jemielniak, 2014) (Aaltonen & Lanzara, 2015). The 
enthusiasm for the openness that the internet has allowed has been huge, it has questioned and 
eroded the centrality of formal organizations in organizing societies, and originated numerous 
and sometimes influential concepts like the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2005), 
‘open innovation’(Chesbrough, 2003), ‘the wealth of networks’(Y. Benkler, 2006), and 
‘generativity’ (Zittrain, 2006). 
Bitcoin first, and other blockchains in subsequent years, originated from the same 
bazaar mode of governance, which relies on globally distributed technical skills, privacy 
concerned actors, rejection of corporations and states. However, blockchains develop 
differently from FOSS because miners and users, who maintain and rely on the blockchain, 
diminish software developers’ freedom of taking the technology where they like. For these 
reasons, the bazaar does not explain blockchain-related governance. We contend that the 
bazaar misses a) significant consequences of digital organizing in general and b) blockchain-
related governance in particular. Regarding the former, bazaar’s advocacy for openness has 
overlooked a far-reaching and unintended consequence of its own principle. On one side it is 
undeniable that removing restrictions to access and distribution of software and data have 
reduced the cost of acquiring the means of production in the networked environment 
(Lyytinen & King, 2006). On the other side, what was not obvious to openness advocates is 
                                                          
includes different modes of organizing like markets, networks, hierarchies, or bazaar, and accounts also for powerful forces like prices, 
agreements, social norms, contingencies, hype, charisma, etc. 
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that FOSS, and user-generated data, have facilitated enormously the emergence of the 
contemporary global IT oligopoly. For example, a multinational corporation like Facebook 
does not need to pay for the FOSS it relies upon heavily, nor for data, which users generate. 
So, theories that captured very neatly the zeitgeist of the internet bazaar of the 90s and 00s, 
lack concepts to foresee – if not to thwart – the massive centralization that network effects 
produce online, and internet companies bank upon. In short, many more people can now 
produce data and software outside of stringent profit logics (Yochai Benkler, 2016). However, 
the bazaar governance lacks explanatory concepts and normative tools to anticipate and 
perhaps prevent the rise of large platforms that exploit openness, thus dominate the digital 
economy. Openness and decentralization do not necessarily go hand in hand.  
Against this broad background, blockchain re-introduces scarcity where abundance 
has become taken-for-granted, and opens a prospect for different rules and coalition-based 
governance. Bitcoin was the first blockchain that tested at scale a rewarding mechanism for 
keeping faceless and globally dispersed actors complying with its rules of authentication. For 
such reason, blockchains are peculiar and interesting for governance: they promise to scale 
easily when they reach a critical mass, but they are difficult to manage because of lack of both 
formal organizational structures and clear boundaries to police. Major governance problems, 
which we exemplify later by discussing the Bitcoin blocksize conflicts and the failure of the 
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), prospect two ways forward: more 
governance ‘on-chain’ and permissioned/consortia-based blockchains. Since the former are 
still in their inception stages, this paper focuses on the latter and relies on cases from the 
second-hand car market and land registries. Before going there, the bazaar and the related 
commons-based peer production (CBPP) need to be described in greater detail. 
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3.1. IT governance 
First, we explored how blockchain relates to existing studies about IT governance. The 
premise is that governance rules and mechanisms are subject to design. Typically, they are 
embedded in an institutional structure, which ensures their enforceability and provides 
mechanisms for conflict resolution. The institutional structure comprises technical and 
organizational forces (e.g. platform, electronic market, permissioned blockchain, laws, rules, 
etc.) and can be a business model (Riemer, Gogolin, & Klein, 2005). 
The term IT Governance has been used since the early 1990s (Henderson & 
Venkatraman, 1993) and became more prominent later in the decade with the works by 
(Brown, 1997) (Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999), while IT projects grew in complexity. IT 
infrastructures developed into stable components of organizational IT portfolios (Peter Weill 
& Broadbent, 1998), thus were suitable for strategic planning. Later, IT governance was 
defined by (P. Weill & Ross, 2004) as the framework for decision rights and accountabilities 
to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT. In P. Weill and Ross (2004) framework, 
political idealtypes are used to describe how people in the enterprise make key decisions. 
Their quite articulated conceptualization is very precise, thus inflexible, to apply to 
blockchains, especially when they are used by ‘crowds’ or across organizations. 
Constantinides and Barrett (2014) offer a rich case of governing the information infrastructure 
of a health care system as collective action, which may be extended beyond the boundaries of 
a hierarchy like a public service.  
In both permissionless and consortia-based blockchains, the influence of actors in the 
position of exercising decision rights is curbed because consensus is automatized and 
distributed. Still, one may say that decisions are displaced rather than abolished, for instance 
to the design of blockchain consensus algorithms. While this is undeniable, there are no 
unequivocal and unanimous rules or procedures of governance (a clear example is the never-
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ending unruly conflict about Bitcoin block size presented below). So, to understand 
blockchain and governance, we need to move to theories that account better for what happens 
when consensus and authentication play a role that did not exist in the bazaar. 
The book by Musiani, Cogburn, DeNardis, and Levinson (2016) looks at social and 
political sciences to account both for the elusiveness to control that the Internet and the 
services based on it showed to traditional decision makers, and for new ways power is being 
exercised through IT. In sum, the spectrum of positions about IT and governance is wide and 
spans from traditional managerial command and control approaches to international anarchy. 
Such diversity suggests that there are basic differences about the understanding of what IT 
are, and how to govern (through) them. For now, we turn briefly our attention to a classic 
debated of organization studies, hierarchy vs. market, in order to introduce and problematize 
the ‘bazaar governance’ (Demil and Lecocq 2006). In the discussion, those issues are 
expanded upon. 
According to Williamson (1975) “governance is a means by which to infuse order in a 
relation where potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual 
gains”. Williamson (1975) core theoretical stance is that transactions entail uncertainty about 
their outcome, due to the bounded rationality and opportunism of agents, so its cost 
discriminate between market and hierarchy we the most suitable governance mode. Malone, 
Yates, and Benjamin (1987) stress how IT may favor markets more than hierarchies. W. W. 
Powell (1990) picked on this dichotomy and argued that market logics might operate within 
hierarchies (incentives, for instance) and hierarchies onto markets (sub-contracting). Then, he 
proposed the network as a new form of organization, which is most suited to domains where 
measurements are difficult, and trust among parties has a paramount role. According to Demil 
and Lecocq (2006), none of these modes of governance suits well the online organizing that 
FOSS exemplifies. 
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First, we continue our theoretical framework by introducing the bazaar as a mode of 
governance that was inspired by FOSS and its peculiar Commons-based-peer-production. 
Then, we conclude our theoretical stance by problematizing the explanatory power of those 
concepts for blockchain-related phenomena.  
3.2. The transgression of online openness: Bazaar 
Especially from the 90s onward, the idea and practice of sharing software code freely, 
thus impeding its trade as a property, was against all the received wisdom of product 
management, and the business model of software multinationals like Microsoft. Despite that, 
FOSS mode of governance proved so effective that it became exemplar for open distributed 
networks. Its successes resonate in the main tenets of the bazaar as a form of governance and 
of the Commons-Based Peer Production (CBPP), which we present in the next section. 
The FOSS literature has explored different aspects of this mode of organizing. Main 
foci have been: motivation and incentive (typically addressed based on voluntary work and 
reputational benefits), protection of the commons against overuse and vandalism, emphasis on 
the creativity that commons licenses allow. Besides its positive effects (facilitating pro-social 
dynamism, creating social welfare), unintended effects emerged (in particular free riding and 
appropriation for commercial purposes other than software trade). 
This mode of digital organizing that originated FOSS transgressed basic principles of 
established modes of governance. Because of its substantial difference, the study of Demil 
and Lecocq (2006) proposes to add a fourth governance idealtype, named ‘bazaar’, to W. W. 
Powell (1990) tripartite categorization of governance forms. Their work, empirically 
grounded into FOSS production, found that Powell’s threefold characterization was not 
satisfactory to explain the then booming phenomenon of FOSS, and by extension the 
information economy. 
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FOSS took a hegemonic position over the internet not only by ignoring much of the 
received wisdom about IT governance, but also projecting the possibilities of open 
collaboration beyond software development. For instance, Wikipedia or voluntary geographic 
information with OpenStreetMap (and user-generated content more broadly) have shown that 
formal organizations are not the only way of getting things done; consumer electronics and 
open internet services have replaced business technologies in leading the ways of innovation; 
crowdfunding has unveiled the blindspots of traditional investors’ preferences.  
The bazaar mode of governance takes its moves from the non-appropriability of digital 
data, protected by open licenses, which allow unrestricted access to the source code so to 
prevent anyone from profiting from software ownership. Based on those principles, Stallman 
(2002) started the free software movement in the 80s. He advocated against regulating 
software through existing copyright laws and proposed the ‘copyleft’, which uses existing 
intellectual property rights to prohibit anyone from owning software code, thus maintains it as 
a public good. Rather than principles of fairness, higher organizational agility and software 
quality were the arguments put forward against proprietary software by the cognate open 
source movement. Despite spats and tensions between them, free software and open source 
(commonly grouped under the umbrella term of FOSS) gave a great impulse to the rise of the 
internet. Detractors claimed that without economic incentives to trade software, and the 
hierarchies to manage its development, FOSS would have failed. Instead, it thrived with an 
organizing mode that Raymond (1999), who developed Fetchmail (a FOSS email client), 
likened to a ‘bazaar’ as opposed to the ‘cathedral’ of software corporations. Starting with the 
popularization of the internet, especially with the World Wide Web, this utopic vision of non-
scarcity has become commonsensical. On the internet, everything has been expected to be 
‘free’ as in ‘free speech’ and as in ‘free beer’. 
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Following the more articulated theorization of the bazaar by Demil and Lecocq 
(2006), the non-appropriability that open licenses guarantee reduces the transaction cost of 
FOSS substantially. The consequent governance mode is an ‘architecture of participation’ 
which provides non-financial incentives for contribution and protects the outcome from 
‘vandalism’: by giving their software away – thus trusting openness and transparency – 
developers build up their reputation, which in turn they can spend providing assistance on the 
software they know (Shaikh & Henfridsson, 2017). So, the bazaar operates at an aggregated 
low level of control on actors’ behaviors, not least because – having full access to source code 
– anyone can always ‘fork’ their software and develop it their own way.  
Since FOSS licenses are viral, forking reinforces the commons by spreading it rather 
than diminishing it. So, FOSS generates limited polarization of public vs. private compared to 
the long-lasting debate around the ‘tragedy of the commons’. As discussed at the end of the 
next section on CBPP, the problematic unintended consequences of FOSS is that it facilitated 
monopolistic businesses (like global platforms) which rely heavily on software without 
commercializing it, thus not breaking its rules nor vandalizing it. The same ease of forking is 
not there with blockchains because, even if the software can be used elsewhere freely, the 
authentication that miners provide and users expect would not be provided by the new ledger, 
like the handwritten 100 euro banknote. This difference is central in our overall argument and 
will be expanded upon after the section on CBPP. 
3.3. Commons-Based Peer Production 
Yochai Benkler (2016) stresses that in the CBPP, the core institutional feature is the 
fact that anyone can use and repurpose the resources on symmetrical terms, without requiring 
permission from any single property owner or administrator. This is the institutional 
framework that allows access to and use of resources in the distributed, self-directed form 
typical of the bazaar. Organizational governance and managerial resource and task definition 
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and allocation utilize combinations of participatory, meritocratic (do-ocracy) and charismatic, 
rather than proprietary or contractual models. In other words, tasks are not assigned but 
picked up by volunteers without coercion in a “diverse, uncertain, complex project space”. 
Collaboration results to be based on self-organizing rather than explicit coordination. 
Under conditions of diffuse and low capital requirements (i.e.  means of production 
are cheap and widely available) and highly modularity of tasks (low interdependency), CBPP 
showed comparative advantages for innovation over more traditional modes based on 
cathedrals or pure markets. Understanding this organizational innovation requires an 
explanation of the advantages that loosely-coupled networks of diversely experienced and 
motivated individuals have over firms or markets as innovation and knowledge production 
models. CBPP is characterized by:  
• highly distributed low-cost means of production (computers and 
communication networks), 
• easy access to information, including software, due to copyleft and 
nearly zero marginal cost, 
• globally dispersed and available human capital. 
The combination of those elements has been allowing to cope with projects whose 
high complexity and uncertainty would have driven both plan-prone hierarchies and profit-
seeking traders away. The following figure places CBPP at the forefront of innovation when 
diversity of knowledge and uncertainty are high. 
In sum, the main governance innovation of CBPP is its confluence of technological, 
organizational and institutional innovations. CBPP allows diverse individuals, who would not 
have been able to communicate and coordinate in advance, to explore collaboratively an 
opportunity space made of resources, problems, people, and potential solutions, self-assign 
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and harness their tacit, creative, or otherwise hard-to-communicate knowledge or facility. 
These loosely-coupled networks can identify or contribute to defining a problem or solution, 
and they can do so relying on diverse, often non-monetary motivations that do not incur into 
the limitations imposed by the need to formalize and standardize their insights, efforts, or 
experimental successes for transmission into formalized channels of markets or hierarchies 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008). 
Advocates and commentators of the CBPP have been aware also of the vulnerability 
and precariousness that the commons are exposed to. An inherent weakness of this mode of 
governance are rogue actors, private organizations, or even governments themselves, finding 
loopholes, undermining, circumventing, or destroying regulation or changing them in their 
favor. There is another issue which is worth stressing here because it offers a theorical view 
onto the re-introduction of scarcity into the digital environments that blockchains allow. 
Despite its extraordinary successes, it is important to stress that the openness on which 
the bazaar and CBPP are based upon does not necessarily result in open and democratic 
consequences, and this is not only because of the vandalism their advocates use to be 
concerned about. Here the reference is to the emergence and consolidation of the IT 
oligopoly, which diminishes both business and consumers’ freedom. As a matter of facts, 
multinationals (and ‘cathedrals’ in general) could and do use FOSS freely without having had 
to develop it, nor to have paid for the high risk of innovation by absorbing the costs of 
frequent failures. They can do that while complying with the copyleft when they use FOSS 
because platform multinationals do not make money out of software trade. Nonetheless, they 
remain the main beneficiaries of the availability of high-quality and free software, so much so 
that they are main contributors to the Linux Foundation. Comparing extremes, a minuscule 
minority may have gained the freedom to run and tinker with Linux on their PC, but 
datacenters run the same free operating system to monetize billions of users’ data. In practice, 
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cathedrals can sit back, look at what emerges successful from global crowds’ constant trial-
and-errors, and cherry pick what to adopt. Thus, long-term and large-scale FOSS implications 
appear to differ from its micro-intentions and principles. Unrestrained participation turns to 
mean ‘participation of the fittest’, paraphrasing Darwin. 
To conclude the section on the bazaar and its unique mode of production, the 
celebrated openness of information infrastructures, where there is always an elsewhere where 
commons-based peer production (CBPP) can grow, has not posed any relevant obstacle to the 
emergence of monopolistic platform companies that rely on free availability of software and 
data, without trading software itself. Thus, they remain indifferent, or even support, the viral 
nature of open licenses while profiting from its quality and convenience. So, the defense of 
openness does not prevent the winners from taking most if not all, while the rest is free to 
experiment on the fringes, swallowing energy drinks and (pipe-)dreaming of being the next 
winner. Raymond proved right in recognizing that the bazaar can work very effectively and 
efficiently. However, the theoretical and practical consequences of this mode of governance 
need scrutiny. Rather than furthering the study of unintended consequences of the bazaar 
openness, this paper looks at blockchain initiatives, which reverse the tide of non-scarcity that 
the bazaar floated upon. Blockchains come from the CBPP milieu, but also bring remarkable 
differences. The organizational characteristics of CBPP are: i) decentralization of conception 
and execution of problems and solutions, ii) harnessing of diverse motivations, including non-
monetary motivations, and iii) separation of governance from property. The last one is 
relevant to focus on because it is the main difference from other FOSS projects. As described 
previously about the bazaar, the copyleft does not allow appropriation of software. So, bazaar 
governance is the open-ended outcome of actors building their reputation while remaining 
under low control and incentive pressures. Blockchains instead, allow property of tokens, 
enforce incentives, thus exercise a certain control on all parties involved. This is expanded 
upon in the following section. 
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3.4. Using and transgressing the bazaar: trusting authentication without 
authenticators 
We keep the description of blockchain architecture to the minimum needed for the 
argument. The main originality of this architecture is that it allows authenticating items 
without relying on a designated actor responsible for it. For Bitcoin, the largest blockchain in 
existence, this happens by making all transactions public and letting all the nodes of the 
network (miners) to certify each transaction. A transaction is authenticated by the 51% of 
computing power available. As a result, on a blockchain, copies are not all the same as they 
used to be.  
Blockchains are based on consensus mechanisms translated into algorithms for 
mining, which protects integrity of transactions and ledger. The operational and technical 
governance mechanisms (roles, rights, obligations, incentives) have been designed by 
individuals or (designated) providers/ owners of blockchains. The integrity of individual 
instances of blockchains is subject to the quality of the design. Despite usual claims about 
trustlessness, use of blockchains always requires users’ trust into institutions and/or systems 
(especially in permissionless blockchains where institutional safeguards are missing). 
The intended effects of blockchains are: facilitating peer transactions without 
institutional support (e.g. financial system, state institutions), peer control without 
government oversight, availability of smart contracts for enforcing integrity. Side effects need 
not be overlooked, especially for what concerns the progressive monopolization of mining, 
and the incomplete (smart) contracts, which will be exemplified later in the DAO case. 
Against the background of non-scarcity that the bazaar openness guarantees and the 
CBPP depends upon, the major innovation introduced by blockchain - and proved viable at 
global scale by Bitcoin - is distributed authentication to avoid both double-spending and 
reliance on external guarantors. Authentication is here intended in its basic meaning of 
Miscione, Goerke, Klein, Schwabe, Ziolkowski 
22 
certification of genuinity, i.e. each of the limited number of tokens in existence can be traced 
back to an owner at any point in time. This means that, although most blockchain software is 
open source, thus it would fall under the bazaar governance mode, tokens’ authenticity, thus 
blockchains’ value, depend also on miners and ledger’s users. This digitally native way of 
authenticating digital items introduces exclusivity, thus scarcity and rivalry. So, it constitutes 
a qualitative shift from the abundance of information goods. 
In other words, money is not data, even if it is digital. If at some point some open 
source web browser users are dissatisfied with the software, they can decide to fork the code 
and develop an independent version to fit their own and new users’ preferences. When this 
happens, users of both versions maintain the capacity to use their software for most if not all 
web browsing purposes. This is not the case with blockchains, whose main purpose is to 
guarantee the authenticity of the data they collate. When a fork takes place, data on the forked 
ledgers may differ, and the expected immutability be undermined. 
Adoption of blockchains comes with the trust, or at least the assumption that 
algorithms can govern organizational relations. Along this line, Lustig and Nardi (2015a) 
investigate how Bitcoin’s algorithm has gained authority and legitimation in allowing new 
trades. In this sense, algorithms are discussed as a way of directing human activities by 
defining what to rely upon. They criticize, like Dodd (2018) does, the emic views of people 
promoting Bitcoin for their naive assumptions about technological neutrality and 
independence from allegedly corrupted politics. A similar approach can be seen in the 
discussion on blockchain-based state governance (Atzori, 2015; MacDonald, Allen, & Potts, 
2016). 
Even if we agree that algorithms are not neutral in transforming human behaviors, 
organizations, and societies, we find that a narrow focus on algorithms does not account for 
novel aspects that blockchains bring to the fore when compared to the bazaar: authentication 
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is guaranteed by miners and legitimized by users. These two types of actors pass overlooked 
by a narrow focus on algorithms. In practice, if we consider only algorithms, we would not 
see much difference between blockchain software, and blockchain in actual use, which 
authenticates its records. The constitutive role of miners and traders beside software 
developers makes blockchain a relevant instance of organizational technologies as distinct 
from information technologies. Especially the centrality of consensus making and 
maintenance sets blockchain design, development, deployment, assessment, and evolution 
apart from technology that only compute and transmit information while leaving consensus to 
organizations. In short, governance cannot be conceived as an add-on topic but needs to be 
considered as constitutive of blockchain. 
Studies that tackle governance issues explicitly, often discuss issues related to 
jurisdiction, which is often uncertain because blockchains shift responsibility for the 
authentication of transactions from recognized guarantors to allegedly independent miners, or 
other consensus mechanisms, which can be located outside of formal organizations and 
jurisdictions’ reach. This makes those dispersed actors not easy to hold accountable. As a 
consequence, legal uncertainty in transactions increases. A way to mitigate this uncertainty 
are so-called smart contracts, envisioned as a layer on the top of blockchains. They gained 
popularity, yet rose controversy. For example, Maurer and DuPont (2015) reflect on the 
applicability of smart contracts and their relationship to law. They claim that distributed, 
autonomous, and self-executing contracts may not be feasible due to their non-contractual 
basis. Indeed, traditional contracts reduce uncertainty by committing all signatories, who 
remain subject to the Rule of Law. Thus, since blockchains may exceed jurisdictions, they can 
fall in the cracks between inconsistent regulations. We consider smart-contracts in relation to 
the case of the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), whose failure exposed the 
limitations of a governance conceptualization that pursues the possibility of creating complete 
contracts, thus sidelining people and institutional context’s role. In sum, the consequences for 
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governance of blockchain-based authentication are studied against the limitation of the bazaar 
organizing.  
4. Methods 
Initially, as typical for exploratory research (Stebbins, 2001) (Briggs & Schwabe, 
2011), we used all available sources to uncover interesting phenomena. To derive appropriate 
concepts to describe them, Langley (1999) offered a particularly helpful guide for 
‘quantification strategy’ (foregrounding of events) and ‘temporal bracketing’. Specifically, we 
reviewed the still scarce, but rapidly growing body of work for reports on blockchain 
governance, alongside scanning more than six hundred sources for related materials collected 
by the research project Coding Value, as well as research databases and search engines such 
as Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar among others. We utilized various search 
strings consisting of ‘blockchain’ and ‘governance’ to ensure wider coverage of research 
domains, such as organizational and social sciences.  
The empirical part of this study comprises two parts: the first is about two exemplar 
governance crises that blockchains encountered in their evolution: a) the conflicts about 
Bitcoin block size (an apparently simple technical issue with far-fetched consequences), and 
b) the failure of the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), which showed the risks 
of assuming the possibility of ‘complete contracts’. The second empirical part is grounded in 
cases that adopted a consortium-based approach to avoid the governance problems that 
Bitcoin and the DAO manifested. 
The Bitcoin block size and DAO cases were easy to select because they have been 
very hotly debated in the global crypto scene because foundational aspects like transaction 
costs and smart-contracts were at stake. For the Bitcoin and DAO cases, we have conducted 
two extensive documentary studies. Since both were public events, meaning that they 
happened on the open internet, direct observation was possible on selected channels like 
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Twitter, Reddit, public repositories and the specialized press that was following those events 
closely. 
Our focus on consortium-based blockchain is the result of long-term engagement in 
interorganizational systems and a large design science research project dedicated to 
improving the used car market. The consortium developing and deploying a distributed ledger 
for the second-hand car market is studied through participant observation in the frame of 
design research. While all authors are well-aware of the progress of this research project, two 
authors have prominent roles in it and have been documenting it extensively. Design and 
deployment of a distributed ledger to make information about second-hand cars more reliable 
required to gain an extensive overview on the state-of-the-art of blockchain projects. This 
allowed to narrow down the key aspects that the following case-studies should highlight: 
relevance of blockchain in low-trust environments, prominence of record immutability, 
governance of access rights, and modes for modifying those rights.  
Those same aspects were considered in the selection of other significant consortium-
based cases. We reviewed existing research with empirical components, Then, we searched 
online for active and promising initiatives, and we focused on blockchain application of land 
registries because they offer an original angle on trust, immutability, access, and governance 
more broadly. Of the many initiatives we found, we analyzed 126 blockchain-based 
companies from a variety of online sources like Crunchbase and Coindesk for their 
governance characteristics. Identifying relevant cases has proved a difficult task because of 
the novelty of this domain and the hype that wraps it. Indeed, there are countless startups, 
initiatives, GitHub projects, but few running implementations, which also causes empirically 
grounded research to be scarce. On the basis of what read in papers, practitioners’ reports, 
grey literature, specialized press, blogs, etc. we shortlisted five cases in three continents to 
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focus on. This meant going deeper in a documentary analysis of the grey literature and 
interviewing prominent actors of those initiatives.  
5. Loss of innocence: no ‘complete contracts’  
The empirical section is articulated in two major parts: the first presents two major 
governance crises that affected the two main blockchains currently in existence: Bitcoin and 
Ethereum. Those ruptures made deeper functioning and risks visible. The second part presents 
consortia-based blockchains, which prospect a viable alternative to the shortcomings of 
assuming the possibility of automatizing governance. 
5.1. Bitcoin scaling crisis 
Let us consider the most prominent blockchain to date: Bitcoin. Attributed to its 
growing rate of adoption, Bitcoin’s number of transactions increased. As a result, the 
blockchain eventually started manifesting bottlenecks in authenticating all transactions in a 
timely fashion. Since its underlying protocol fixes Bitcoin's throughput (transactions handled 
per time unit), developers proposed various modifications to solve imminent scaling 
problems. These were supposed to recover Bitcoin’s prospects to be used as a global 
electronic cash and micropayment system. However, none of these solutions has so far been 
broadly agreed upon, and in retrospect, this so-called scaling debate repeatedly plunged the 
community into crises. 
At the core of the scaling problem, there is Bitcoin’s 1MB block size limit. It was 
initially set in 2010 by its anonymous founder, Satoshi Nakamoto2, aiming to prevent 
attackers from launching denial-of-service attacks by creating large blocks that would cripple 
validators and thereby the network. This parameter has not been changed since, although 
                                                          
2 Git commit: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/a30b56ebe76ffff9f9cc8a6667186179413c6349#diff-
118fcbaaba162ba17933c7893247df3aR2614 
Hanseatic governance - Blockchain as organizational technology 
 
27 
Bitcoin’s developers publicly recognized the imminent scaling issues shortly after the 
limitation’s introduction. The reason for this dormancy is manifold: first, solving the 
scalability issue is only possible by amending Bitcoin’s protocol, which is a delicate 
procedure and can, when failed, divide the network. Such changes are called ‘forks’, as they 
differently continue a shared transaction history as soon as the amended and incompatible 
ruleset is applied. Second, Bitcoin’s security relies on the economics evoked by the protocol. 
It is thus not entirely clear which consequences entail when the parameter is changed. E.g., it 
is assumed that a too large block size would paralyze the network, bloat the blockchain, and 
increase costs required to run a node. As a result, power would be concentrated among a few 
validators, weakening decentralization, and lastly, decrease security. Lastly, multiple 
approaches were so far proposed; however, it seems not yet decided which one suits the 
community, its various players, and incentives best.  
After the problem’s identification, solutions and their impact have been openly 
discussed in mailing lists, forums and social networks like Reddit and Twitter. In 2015, these 
preparations brought forth the first remarkable amendment suggestions: Bitcoin Improvement 
Proposals (BIP) 1003 and 1014. The former suggested to introduce a variable block size and 
the latter proposed to increase it from 1MB to 8MB straightaway. BIP 101 was first 
implemented by Bitcoin XT, one of Bitcoin’s first hard-forks, which could after all not 
establish itself as the ‘new Bitcoin’. Another fork, called Bitcoin Classic was created in 
response to XT’s failing and aimed to set the block size at 2MB. At the same time, Bitcoin 
Unlimited emerged and allowed users to signal their preferred block size limit. Ultimately, 
none of these alternatives gained sufficient momentum, and the forks’ node counts started 
                                                          
3 http://gtf.org/garzik/bitcoin/BIP100-blocksizechangeproposal.pdf 
4 https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0101.mediawiki 
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approaching zero5. Around that time, it started to become clear that the block size was going 
to have far-fetching consequences. In a nutshell, large blocks would make Bitcoin like global 
cash because they would increase volume capacity and reduce transaction cost, so to open the 
way to countless microtransactions (even finer granularity than current plastic money). Small 
blocks would make Bitcoin more like gold, something to hoard for its deflationary 
characteristic. Looking back at those days later, one may argue that this shortsighted turf war 
was a main cause of the bubble bust in 2018, when crypto had not reached a wide enough user 
base as cash, nor the safe haven perception that gold gained over millennia. 
Bitcoin Unlimited developers started another more organized attempt and proposed 
Bitcoin Cash in May 2017. The fork was eventually created in partnership with Bitcoin XT’s 
community the same year on August 1st. All previously named solutions depict hard-forks, 
meaning there is no backward-compatibility, which causes them to originate a transaction 
chain distinct from Bitcoin’s. They furthermore need to be maintained by different miners, 
traders, and developers. An alternative and less strict solution to hard-forking came from the 
SegWit (Segregated Witness) soft-fork. Although it was initially proposed in 2015 as BIP 141 
to solve an unrelated issue, namely transaction malleability, it also allows for more 
transactions within a block without increasing the actual block size, which is achieved by 
relocating the transaction’s signature storage. The soft-fork has been activated by Bitcoin’s 
miners on August 23rd 2017, and can since be utilized by any transaction on the Bitcoin 
network. Beyond its immediate effect on Bitcoin’s throughput, the thereby introduced 
transaction malleability is regarded as a precondition for more sophisticated `off-the-chain’ 
second-layer solutions, e.g., the Lightning Network. These allow for a virtually unlimited 
number of low-fee microtransactions and are therefore hoped to solve scaling problems. 
However, neither the soft- nor the hard-fork solution are generally accepted, proved, or 
                                                          
5 https://medium.com/@WhalePanda/roger-ver-from-bitcoin-jesus-to-bitcoin-antichrist-69fc7a17c622 
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adopted, yet. To a greater degree, there is political competition, radicalization, and fight 
between supporters of the two solutions, which is examined in the following paragraphs. 
When in March 2017 both Bitcoin’s average block size reached the 1MB size limit6, 
and the Bitcoin Cash fork was announced, the debate got heated once again and was even 
feared to spark a ‘civil war’. Since Bitcoin was reaching fresh all-time highs during this 
period ($1.270 on March 6, up from $760 on January 6)7, the discussion was particularly 
relevant and the actors highly financially incentivized. The debate was mainly characterized 
by two opposing groups, of which the Bitcoin Cash supporting faction argued that Bitcoin 
was meant to be a low fee cash system at any time and thus needed to be amended right away. 
They further opposed the planned activation of SegWit due to its algorithmic complexity. In 
contrast, 1MB advocates were looking at Bitcoin as a ‘store of value’8 and was unwilling to 
implement unproven changes. Instead, they looked to implement the well-researched and 
lower-risk SegWit soft-fork later that year, which would serve as a basis for second layer 
solutions like the Lightning Network. Both groups nearly religiously justified their goals and 
means, interpreting Nakamoto’s initial vision and Bitcoin’s whitepaper as being supportive of 
their respective goals.9 
Being frustrated about the Bitcoin core developers’ passivity, fork supporters, led by 
the initiator Roger Ver, assumed that they were impeding change purposefully. Furthermore, 
they stated the involvement of a Blockchain company, called Blockstream, to be the cause of 
                                                          
6 https://www.blockchain.com/charts/avg-block-size?timespan=all 
7 https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ 
8 https://www.coindesk.com/what-is-the-bitcoin-block-size-debate-and-why-does-it-matter 
9 This article lists what of the whitepaper has been adapted and what not: https://www.coindesk.com/what-bitcoins-white-paper-got-right-
wrong-and-what-we-still-dont-know 
 
Miscione, Goerke, Klein, Schwabe, Ziolkowski 
30 
this.10 Since it funded both Bitcoin’s development and simultaneously created own products 
that could have benefited from an imperfect network, there allegedly was a conflict of 
interest. Others regarded these as ‘conspiracy theories’11, solely arranged to justify the forking 
of the network. They further accused Ver of spamming Bitcoin’s network to increase 
transaction fees, reduce its usability and poach users in preparation for the fork’s launch. At 
this point, each side got repeatedly accused of manipulating and censoring social media to 
influence the upcoming forking event’s outcome. Thus, heavy fights were staged on Reddit 
and Twitter, where forking efforts were commonly disregarded by discrediting Bitcoin Cash, 
e.g., by dismissing it as a scam and referring to it as `bcash’. This intended to deprive its 
namely relation to the initial chain, and to discourage investors by reducing its prospects of 
success. Roger Ver was further blamed of deploying ‘sock puppets’ to influence online 
forums’ sentiments12. Despite both sides’ dishonesty, Bitcoin Cash was successfully launched 
in August 2017 and reached a total market share of nearly 10%.13 Thus, most users valuated 
the original Bitcoin chain more. After its launch, Bitcoin Cash was the target of multiple 
unsuccessful spamming attacks aiming to paralyze the network.14 The consensus’ state was 
furthermore highly opaque during this time due to the attendance of hidden actors that 
contributed to the situation’s complexity: investors’ manipulation and speculation caused 
exchange prices not to reflect the networks’ actual valuations, and members noted to ‘not 
expect anything more [than making money] from this’.15 Moreover, the outcome was 
significantly dependent on one more, purely financially motivated group that had decisive 
power over governance processes: miners. They earn block rewards and transaction fees in 
                                                          
10 https://medium.com/@octskyward/on-block-sizes-e047bc9f830 
11 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/65a4z4/why_has_raising_the_blocksize_limit_become_so/ 
12 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/87t3ot/delicious_proof_that_roger_employs_sockpuppets/ 
13 https://coinmarketcap.com/charts 
14 https://ambcrypto.com/bitcoin-cash-bch-under-attack-individual-vs-investors/ 
15 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2040221.940 
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return for validating and maintaining Bitcoin’s public ledger by authenticating and recording 
all transactions. Thus, miners were making money out of the high transaction costs granted by 
the status quo. However, some large mining businesses unexpectedly supported Bitcoin Cash, 
supposedly due to bribery as many users presumed on social media. Further consequences 
arising out of the debate’s forks and their relatively high valuation are expressed by effects 
like the ‘Forking Craze’16: many forks emerged as individuals recognized the simplicity of 
forking Bitcoin without adding actual improvements or technical know-how. This 
complicated any serious consensus making processes after that since actual proposals can 
hardly be distinguished from ‘money grabs’.  
5.2. The Decentralized Autonomous Organization 
The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) was a social experiment in 
organizational governance. Its goal was to bring forth a decentralized and innovative business 
model, which would allow a group of investors to transparently, democratically and fairly 
fund collectively voted projects using the raised cryptocurrency capital. Being built upon 
Ethereum’s smart contract feature, The DAO was the first of its kind. It has initially been 
proposed by a small blockchain venture, called Slock.it, and was created in close cooperation 
with its community and allowed various actors to get involved with the project’s development 
process. This spirit of openness and decentralization helped The DAO to gain traction and 
success quickly.17 
This visionary platform launched on April 30, 2016, after the closing of the to-date 
most successful crowd sale on May 28th. It raised approx. 14% of Ethereum’s total currency 
supply and has been the largest initial coin offering (ICO) by then. Despite The DAO’s high 
valuation and its smart contract’s rather compact source code, multiple programming flaws 
                                                          
16 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-23/bitcoin-may-split-50-times-in-2018-as-forking-craze-accelerates 
17 https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5 
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existed within the launched product. These were identified and fixed by its developer in June 
of the same year. One error, however, went unnoticed and was exploited by an anonymous 
hacker on June 17th, who drained about a third of the enclosed funds. The thereby obtained 
funds were, because of technical failsafe methods, not freely withdrawable. Instead, the 
attacker had to initiate The DAO’s inbuilt mechanism of exiting the organization. This 
process, also known as the ‘split-function’18, would create a new child DAO solely 
comprising the withdrawing user’s funds and thus allow the holder to create and approve a 
proposal to disburse the funds to an arbitrary address – for which the voting period of 28 days 
applied. This timeframe allowed for mutual consideration among the developers, users, and 
miners regarding the measures to be put in place. However, it quickly became apparent that 
this issue was out of The DAO’s control. Its smart contract had been executed accordingly to 
its design and credited to the idea of decentralization and ‘code is law’ principles, the contract 
contained no inbuilt measures to expropriate the hacker, who complied with the contract’s 
rules and thereby, at least technically, obtained the funds legally. As a result, The DAO’s 
incident was only, if at all, to be solved on underlying layer, i.e., Ethereum’s blockchain. The 
project’s prominence henceforth put financial, media, and legal pressure on Ethereum’s 
community to make an appearance and decide on the event’s handling. The project’s 
community, attributed to the idea of decentralized governance, vividly engaged in the 
decision-making process on open social platforms to contradictorily decide about a smart 
contract’s repeal, which intends to autonomously and unambiguously adjudicate. The open 
discussion provides well examinable evidence of social consensus mechanisms and the case’s 
prevailing sentiments, as will be displayed in the following paragraphs. 
                                                          
18 https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5 
https://github.com/slockit/DAO/wiki/How-to-split-the-DAO 
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Following the exploit, a group of The DAO’s and Ethereum's lead developers and 
community members teamed up quickly and convinced major exchanges to halt the native 
Ethereum's token (ETH) trading, which was the currency of the stolen capital. 
Simultaneously, white-hat counter attacks drained and secured the remaining funds, which by 
the community was perceived as them taking the ‘role of fiduciary to The DAO and its 
members’. Having averted further and imminent threats, long-term strategies were discussed. 
These inevitably consisted of either ignoring and accepting the exploit or introducing changes 
to Ethereum’s protocol, i.e., forking. These changes would either blacklist all the contract’s 
outgoing transactions (for the attacker to be unable to withdraw stolen funds) or remove 
malicious transactions from Ethereum’s supposedly immutable blockchain altogether. The 
former type of protocol change portrayed a solution in which past transactions would not have 
to be invalidated, i.e., a soft-fork. Although it depicted a middle ground, it had to be excluded 
from consideration due to technical impediments. Thus, two opposing main factions remained 
in this debate, namely such that called for an amendment, i.e. a hard-fork, and such that 
opposed any interference. Supporters of the latter persuasion argued that ‘transactions are 
immutable and code is law’.19 Expressed technically, there should never be a hack of the 
ledger because reversing the exploit would contradict both core beliefs and purpose of 
decentralization. Members of this sentiment considered any intervention a ‘centralized bailout 
[of a] decentralized protocol’20 and described The DAO as being ‘too big to fail’21. Besides, 
the problem was not considered to be Ethereum’s, but The DAO’s and so users blamed 
Slock.it for having produced a contract whose ‘code was rushed [and its] governance weak 
                                                          
19 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4unpm3/the_dao_and_the_benefactors/ 
20 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethtrader/comments/4oif5c/fck_this_dao/ 
21 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oithy/a_too_big_to_fail_political_hard_fork_is_very/ 
 
Miscione, Goerke, Klein, Schwabe, Ziolkowski 
34 
and untested’.22 By contrast, forking advocates regarded the proposed amendment to depict 
‘business as usual’23, claiming24 that fixing bugs within protocols has always been part of 
iterative development processes. These same people also argued that The DAO was well-
known to be a ‘highly experimental technology’25, therefore wishing to quickly move on 
while memorizing the incident as a ‘very expensive lesson learned’26. By arguing so, they 
framed the interpretation according to the bazaar mode of production and away from the 
authenticity and immutability aspect that blockchains are rooted in.  
Ultimately, ‘compulsory voting’27, as one user put it, decided on the outcome. The 
process to vote on and identify the most supported solution was technically realized by miners 
submitting their hash power to the favored chain. The faction opposing the fork eventually 
turned out to be in the minority and blamed, among others, Ethereum's founder, Vitalik 
Buterin, for exerting his political clout in favor of an intervention. The presence of 
Ethereum’s ‘benevolent autocrat’ became well visible in this situation, distinguishing it from 
Bitcoin and its anonymous founder who withdrew completely and appeared no more during 
debates to voice his well-respected opinion, letting factions fight flying the flag of his 
writings. One user voiced his view on the situation by concluding ‘chancellor Vitalik on brink 
of first bailout for DAOs’; a comment that was even published on Bitcoin’s blockchain.28 
                                                          
22 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4ostmj/the_dao_hack_a_lesson_in_true_decentralisation/ 
23 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4op69x/no_hard_fork_does_not_mean_dao_holders_lose_all/ 
24 https://www.parity.io/attack-on-the-dao-what-will-be-your-response/ 
25 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oiqj7/critical_update_re_dao_vulnerability/ 
26 https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/comments/8b0xib/maker_weekly_discussion_april_9/ 
27 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4stiuh/dao_hardfork_implementations_almost_ready/ 
28 https://btc.com/86f03176beef99ac2f5adecd39b964f874f5ec615a9d01e88ac781c6e669753c It is worth noting here that cryptocurrencies, 
characterized by deflationary tendencies (no one can arbitrarily increase the monetary mass, unlike banks), matured a deep resentment for 
bailouts and quantitative easing policies, which characterized the last decade. 
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Having introduced the hard-fork to undo the exploit, The DAO's investors could reclaim their 
lost tokens. Although this solution was acceptable for the majority of stakeholders, some 
miners and users refused to acknowledge the new protocol and continued to apply the original 
rule-set. This inevitably caused the fork and induced a chain-split, dividing the project into 
two distinct branches. While the original blockchain is since referred to as `Ethereum 
Classic’, the current Ethereum main chain is actually the forked one, not the original. 
Following this precedent and its obvious consensus-making difficulties, one user aptly 
wondered ‘if there will ever be a consent on proposals with that many shareholders’.29 
Altogether, a single project’s failure, operating on an open platform, became a broader 
community’s concern, forcing it into internal disputes and re-interpreting its core values: As 
no compromise solution was available, any decision would either lead to infringing 
Ethereum’s immutability and thereby betraying decentralization’s and its fundamental values, 
or losing valuation and the user’s assets. One part regarded the outcome a ‘legitimate 
community response’30 and did not consider decentralization to imply being ‘static, stupid or 
powerless against attackers’.31 Others saw the tyranny of the majority in the voted solution the 
‘[ending] of what Ethereum was always meant to be’32 and considered the existence of this 
outcome evidence that soon ‘money [would] be censored’33, too. However, most of the fork 
opposers ultimately applied the new rule-set, understanding Ethereum to be a ‘democracy, not 
technocracy’34 in which ‘all that matters is consensus’35, even if executed algorithmically.  
                                                          
29 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4ihkld/the_dao_must_diversify/ 
30 https://www.parity.io/attack-on-the-dao-what-will-be-your-response/ 
31 https://www.reddit.com/r/TheDao/comments/4oisep/ether_safe_but_dao_cancelled_were_getting_a_refund/ 
32 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oj7ql/personal_statement_regarding_the_fork/ 
33 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oiib4/dao_is_safe/ 
34 https://www.reddit.com/r/Futurology/comments/2bypb7/does_an_automated_society_still_need_humanrun/ 
35 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2fch11/would_you_argue_that_bitcoin_has_more_or_less/ 
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5.3. More of the same: governance on-chain: ‘code is constitution’ 
Considering the two previously examined cases of forkings, paired with the ease the 
bazaar can be swept by network effects, blockchain's main tenets need consideration beyond 
the easy enthusiasm that has characterized this emerging architecture. Parts of the technical 
community recognized early on the inherent power-accumulation issues of proof-of-work 
systems and started inventing alternative mechanisms. These were to spread decision-making 
equally among all actors and thus essentially set to establish a democracy on the blockchain. 
The consequential 'on-chain governance' systems extend the DAO's core idea by formalizing 
governance or voting rules at the protocol layer and thus enable all actors, i.e., validators, 
users and developers alike, to participate. Therefore, code moves one level deeper and 
becomes the quivalent of a constitution, according to which laws can be defined. These 
initiatives aim at avoiding the governance problems that block size and DAO exemplified 
without giving in the a return of more traditional and established modes of governance, based 
on human and discretionary decision-making. 
Being among the first of its kind, the previously examined DAO showed close 
resemblances to on-chain governance by incorporating voting processes into its smart 
contract. Thus, The DAO is the predecessor of more recent on-chain governance efforts. 
Leveraging and extending the failed experiments’ vision, the Tezos network was launched in 
early 2018. It aims at becoming a ‘self-amending’ cryptocurrency and to provide a platform 
which can be shaped by its users who can propose and vote changes to efficiently amend the 
network when needed, e.g., update algorithms or to patch vulnerabilities. Further extending 
this idea, Aragon aims to decentralize the creation and maintenance of organizational 
structures and lets its users easily create custom, private and transparent DAOs.  
Elucidated by these project’s visions, governance on-chain, i.e., scripted into the 
Blockchain’s protocol, promises to disrupt traditional mechanisms as they finally allow for 
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large networks to be governed collectively, which has effectively not been possible before36. 
Such being the case, it might be argued that the newly enabled governance mode is one of 
Blockchain’s pivotal disruptive properties. 
However, there are drawbacks and risks in designing such systems. To achieve on-
chain governance, protocols are compelled to operate upon a 'one coin, one vote' policy to 
prevent sybil attacks, i.e., users who create multiple blockchain accounts to forge identities 
and thus voting power. As opposed to the democracy principle 'one head, one vote', these 
systems reward wealth with power and may rather be termed plutocracies, which entails 
serious hazards: bribery, cartels, low voter turnout, centralization. Ultimately, instead of 
attaining their goal of bringing people back into governing blockchains, on-chain governance 
systems, in their current state, may be pushing them even farther out. Furthermore, as humans 
can change systems they do not like, on-chain systems are still subject to forking, as e.g. 
happened to Tezos shortly after its launch. Hence, they may be said to inherit their 
predecessor's vulnerabilities due to the illusive possibility of ‘complete contracts’, and add 
new ones to them. In any case, since these are very early days of on-chain governance, which 
is like moving from ‘code is law’ to ‘code is constitution’, they cannot be studied in practice. 
Rather than speculating if they can bring or not more democracy, we focus on more advanced 
experimentations that rely on the establishment of consortia, which retain powers on the 
networks they sustain. 
6. Hanseatic governance: building coalitions  
As anticipated, consortia-based blockchains aim at retaining the peculiarities of 
blockchain as a distributed architecture for authentication without the governance problems 
that hindered the evolution of permissionless blockchains. They aim at that goal with case-
                                                          
36 http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/afgjp/PADM601%20Fall%202011/Modes%20of%20Network%20Governance.%202008.pdf 
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specific tailoring of access and authentication rights, allocation of responsibilities, reliance on 
existing jurisdictions and institutional contexts. 
6.1. The CarDossier 
The main case we use to illustrate consortia-based blockchain projects deals with the 
used car market, where: a) good and bad cars are not easy to distinguish, thus worse cars drive 
better ones out of the market (Akerlof, 1978), and b) parties with better information are more 
likely to strike better deals. In other terms, information asymmetry is inherent to the used-car 
market. We were early on interested in how far blockchain’s immutability may reduce 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, thus reducing the negative influence of 
'lemons' onto the used car market. Consequently, when we applied for funding, we adopted an 
information management angle rather than an economic one. The sought effect might be a 
better market, but this was beyond the scope, and the time constraints, of our work. Our 
interest was how to manage information differently. We would not know if industry partners 
would welcome our project as we might affect existing business models. From a broader 
perspective, multiple actors in the automotive domain – especially used-car dealers – live off 
the mistrust and fragmentation of information sources. The former induces the latter: Even if 
the information is shared, one cannot assess its truthfulness easily because various ‘truths’ 
from various sources may circulate. In other words: traceability and authenticity of 
information, which blockchain provides natively, may reduce the current asymmetry of 
information.  
The ability to make a good assessment of a car’s value relates to the completeness and 
reliability of information about it. However, obtaining all car information can be a daunting 
endeavor. During the years long lifecycle of a car, numerous actors (insurances, repair shops, 
state agencies, and many more) are involved. They contribute to a long-term authentication 
process (comprising proof of ownership, repairment, insurance/driver’s license validity) while 
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collaborating only to the necessary degree; this leaves all information about a car fragmented 
at best, which entices to opportunistic behavior. These information silos do not only exist 
inside of companies but also in the market. There have been many efforts to aggregate, 
consolidate, and commercialize car-related data. Alongside with AutoCheck and Carfax being 
the most prominent ones, numerous companies source data from dealers, DMVs, repair shops, 
or from car owners for compensation, thus profit from selling car history reports to end 
customers. While sourced data can generally be believed to be consistent, performed analyses 
and conclusions in forms of a report may vary as they are subject to company-specific 
measures and interpretation. Besides, these platforms generally are not accountable for the 
provided data’s accuracy. To which platform should end customer turn their attention? What 
if data of one platform conflicts with another? The secondary market of car-related 
information resembles a bazaar, which undermines the overall reliability of information not 
least because these platforms create a data abundance which leaves buyers uncertain. In 
practice, it became apparent that creating a more consistent and reliable record of cars would 
have required the coordinated effort of many actors. In the following, we inspect a solution 
that strives to overcome some of these challenges.  
The CarDossier is a Swiss-based project initiated in early 2017 which aims to develop 
a platform for car-related data and has been funded by the Swiss commission of technology 
and innovation. It is being run by a coalition of major stakeholders in the Swiss automotive 
market: The biggest importer and repair shop of cars, a major insurance, a road traffic agency, 
researchers, a mobility service provider, as well as legal and IT experts. These founding 
partners were motivated to build a platform that opens up a multi-sided market for digital 
information goods where private as well as corporate actors monetize their data upon 
provision and usage, rather than giving it away for free as per the current dominant business 
model of global online platforms. One core use case certainly overlaps with Carfax’s and 
AutoCheck’s car history reports. Going beyond this use case, having truthful data accessible 
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to others allows the digitization and automation of tedious, repetitive, and error-prone 
activities (e.g. Collecting, authenticating/sealing, sharing documents) nowadays conducted 
manually and inefficiently. For another, and maybe even more importantly, the overall 
reliability of data is considerably higher as companies would contribute to and rely upon one 
source for data for in-house processes, which diminishes parts of inconsistent information 
silos. Unreliable data for in-house processes has been confirmed by our project partners to be 
one of the main driver for their part-taking in this consortium. Hence, initial business cases 
were clear very early on, quite differently from the bazaar governance that leaves those 
reflections for later stages. 
The CarDossier coalition comprises organizations of all points of the value chain, as 
well as competitors. While the project advanced, governance challenges became prominent. 
Interestingly enough, this does not hinder the belief in the prospective gains of the platform. 
One major challenge referred to the coordination of interests and a subsequent agreement on 
core collaboration traits. To stabilize the coordination of these, as an anchor on known (legal) 
grounds, and as the first point of contact in case of conflicts, the CarDossier coalition founded 
an association to provide a clearer point of reference for governance of the shared platform. 
Rather than expecting to be able to anticipate the details of future relationships between 
actors, thus develop on-chain governance, as the believers in complete contacts would do, this 
coalition agreed on an association’s statute (pact) comprising core rules such as membership 
rights and obligations, the association’s purpose, fee structures, and thereby serves as a 
playbook for a novel application domain to defend and facilitate the trade of (novel) goods. If 
conflicts emerge in the future, standard societal and legal modes of conflict resolution would 
apply. One may object that this choice limits innovation potential, but participants decided to 
build on the existing institutional context, which is conceived as an enabler rather than an 
obstacle to innovation. For instance, a cantonal traffic authority weighted in to instill 
credibility into the project since its inception. 
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With an agreed-upon common understanding, decision rights became central. Within 
the association, all major decision rights are taken at the association’s board meetings. Their 
demands are translated into system requirements and then developed and enacted by a third-
party platform provider. Members (also private actors) are allowed to propose and discuss 
changes to the system. The weight of each one’s vote varies. For the first two years, to 
develop the core of the platform and to make the platform running, the coalition of founding 
members keeps 51% of overall voting power, while joining partners earn voting amounts 
corresponding to their investments with fixed minima and maxima. After the initial phase, 
votes will automatically be weighted via smart contracts upon defined criteria, such as prior 
voting participation, financial contribution, data contribution, reputation, and many more. 
This way, platform participants are incentivized to participate and earn influence in return, 
which formalizes one’s contribution to the platform. Instead of giving a fixed amount of 
votes, we aspire to achieve this way a fairer variable distribution of votes. What’s more, by 
facilitating to make voices heard, decision-making, as well as decision enforcement, social 
consensus is achieved on blockchains; especially decision enforcement distinguishes the 
CarDossier from other bazaar projects as forking is not an option. 
While the previous measures aimed at internal coordination activities, also contextual 
awareness has shaped our action. Legal experts and state authorities inhere pivotal roles to 
this endeavor as major challenges lay on the legal and regulators’ side. E.g., in the beginning, 
the coalition planned to found a for-profit legal entity to pay respect to the trade of data and 
the revenue it entails. Eventually, the coalition opted for a non-profit association for several 
reasons, with one being central: A for-profit legal entity would draw similarities to other 
platforms such as Facebook or Google, with the primal goal of profit maximization rather 
than participants’ diverse interests. For example, the CarDossier heavily relies on the 
participation of private actors such as car owners to obtain information which otherwise 
would be unavailable; they have to feel sure that their data is in safe hands. Another reason is 
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the participation of state agencies and other public institutions in the platform, as well as the 
integration of their processes, which is substantially eased if conducted through an entity with 
no primal profit interests. Finally, the participation of the latter is crucial as it instills trust into 
the association in the eye of everyone, and by this may increase data reliability. 
Alongside with the character of the legal entity, data privacy emerged as a defining 
problem for the coalition, especially for the choice of the technological platform. Personal and 
car-related data cannot be distinguished easily from each other. While the sharing of the latter 
is generally harmless, the former is quite sensitive, and heavily regulated, especially by the 
GDPR. Since drawing the line between the two is not straightforward, the system has had to 
be designed compartmentalizing different kinds of data to be legally compliant. A first proof-
of-concept built on Hyperledger was disregarded because of this matter: Distributing all data 
to all participating nodes, even if encrypted, proved not viable for our project. Encryptions 
weaken over time which would require regular re-encryption. Furthermore, as all data is 
shared, the association would have no mean to terminate local data usage as every participant 
would manage a full node independently. The CarDossier coalition, together with regulators, 
IT as well as legal experts, therefore decided to move in a joint effort to the so-called R3 
Corda platform, a distributed ledger technology (DLT). In a nutshell, data is merely shared 
and persisted between participants of a single transaction and not distributed to all. Not only 
does this allow for a significantly higher transaction throughput, but it also allows for easier 
compliance to data security regulations as the GDPR, which took effect in May 2018 in the 
European Union. The GDPR grants individuals the right to require the deletion of, simply 
speaking, personal data. This contradicts the immutability property of blockchains. On our 
Hyperledger prototype, this would have meant hard-forking and re-encryption upon every 
single deletion request. Corda proves viable in this regard, as data is effectively considered 
deleted when participating parties discard their transaction. 
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The CarDossier not only provides a single source for car data, but also immutable, 
shared, and agreed upon functions in forms of smart contracts. The aspired efficiency gains 
tackle rather linear inter-organizational processes with pre-defined outcomes; the assessment 
of those outcomes also needs to be based on pre-set and agreed characteristics. One example 
of a scripted process refers to the rules of data access management. These rules are inscribed 
in smart contracts and vary per role (a role represents an actor in the ecosystem); a role 
merely sees data which it is allowed to see. A role can further inhere rights to perform specific 
functions, such as issuing an electronic vehicle registration document (road traffic agency) or 
the insurance certificate (insurer). These smart contracts, same as seen in the case of The 
DAO, come with the promise of completeness; the functions of control and supervision of 
these are thereby inscribed in the protocol and displaced from external guarantors. 
Concluding, establishing a market for authentic information does not come easy. Its 
shape and functioning are not only endogenous of the coalition, but also exogenous, to the 
extend existing businesses, regulators, and public opinion are seen as a resource rather than an 
obstacle to innovation.  
6.2. Blockchain-based Land Registries 
When the blockchain hype hit the shores of other application domains, the land 
registry domain emerged as a promising use case for blockchain systems as noted in the 
World Economic Forum early on Hutt (2016). Blockchain-based land registries come with the 
promise of overcoming several of the challenges of this complex and multi-stakeholder (land-
owners, brokers, notaries, banks, and state agencies) inter-organizational setting with far-
fetched ramifications in all parts of economy and society. The processes of authenticating 
rightful land ownership and the rightfulness of a land ownership transfer vary vastly among 
countries, but several commonalities are observed: They can be considered slow, sparsely 
digitized, often opaque, costly, and embedded into a very low trust environment. Because of 
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its high valuations at stake, not least for its use as collateral, land registration is heavily 
exposed to fraudulent behaviors which have been particularly problematic in developing 
countries (De’, 2005; De’ & Sen, 2004). Especially in developing countries, the considerably 
high costs contribute to a high percentage of land left unregistered, up to approximately 78% 
in Ghana (Kshetri, 2017).  
Most of those records are paper-based, which have provided an acceptable level of 
longevity and reliability, generally speaking. It comes as no surprise that mostly, but not only, 
developing countries put a particular emphasis on this matter. Land tenure is indeed seen as a 
basis for further economic development, including financing through collaterals. However, 
there is empirical evidence for the contrary as paper-based documents can be altered, deleted, 
or lost: E.g., when a devastating earthquake hit Haiti, many land records were destroyed. This 
incident caused not only a wave of land ownership disputes lasting until today, but it also 
hindered other, essential processes such as the reconstruction of lost sites (Moloney, 2010). 
Not only natural catastrophes endanger the reliability of records, but also political instability, 
corruption, fraud, or, in extreme cases, invasions. Fraudulent renting, expropriations, 
extortion, and bribery are similarly well documented as corruption in dealing with 
governmental or notary third parties.  This is not to say that blockchains would overcome all 
these challenges, neither can it help in verifying land titles – but it may ease these and thereby 
increase the reliability of records by digitizing records as well offering a tamper-resistant, 
decentralized database37. However, this effort cannot be pursued in isolation because the 
system would not overcome common reasons for failure, like corruption. Its potential might 
be fulfilled when several parties collaborate for data longevity and share the audit of data and 
                                                          
37 Reese, F. 2017. “Land Registry: A Big Blockchain Use Case Explored,” CoinDesk, , April 19. (https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-
land-registry-solution-seeking-problem, accessed November 26, 2018) 
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actions (Ziolkowski et al. 2018) - Land title oversight and management needs thereby to be 
displaced from single entities to a coalition of stakeholders. 
As for efficiency gains, a blockchain system promises to decrease costs and time spent 
dramatically; the same could hold true for the transparency and reliability of records. On a 
blockchain, both costs could be reduced to no more than 0.05-0.10 USD per transaction 
(Kshetri 2017). From a temporal perspective, the processes of land registration or transfer 
might be conducted within minutes instead of days or months (Nimfuehr 2017). In the 
following, we inspect two cases of blockchain-based land registries in more detail, namely in 
Georgia and Honduras. We believe these cases cover the essential traits of other blockchain-
based land registry systems as well, like those we studied in Sweden and Ghana. All of these 
cases officially announced projects to store and transfer records of land ownership via 
blockchain which we started to observe very early on. It is remarkable, how over time other 
states, cities, or regions announced to pilot blockchain-based land registries as well, such as 
Vermont in the USA, Dubai, Kenya, Ukraine, UK, Andhra Pradesh in India, Russia, Japan, as 
well as Brazil.38 While most of these are prototypes in early stages, we believe our observed 
cases to consider the most matures ones. 
                                                          
38  - Zuckerman, M. J. 2018. “Vermont’s Pilot Program Completes First US All-Blockchain Real Estate Transaction,” Cointelegraph, , March 
8. (https://cointelegraph.com/news/vermonts-pilot-program-completes-first-us-all-blockchain-real-estate-transaction, accessed December 4, 
2018). 
- Hochstein, M. 2017. “Dubai Land Department Launches Blockchain Real Estate Initiative,” CoinDesk, , October 10. 
(https://www.coindesk.com/dubai-land-department-launches-blockchain-real-estate-initiative, accessed December 4, 2018). 
- Mwathane, I. 2018. “MWATHANE: Blockchain Technology: Are Kenya’s Land Registries,” Daily Nation. 
(https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Blockchain-technology/440808-4749098-tras4j/index.html, accessed November 27, 2018). 
- Tian, C. 2017. “Ukrainian Government to Start Blockchain Land Registry Trial in October - CoinDesk.” 
(https://www.coindesk.com/ukrainian-government-to-start-blockchain-land-registry-trial-in-october, accessed December 4, 2018). 
- Das, S. 2017. “Japan Could Place Its Entire Property Registry on a Blockchain,” CCN, , June 22. (https://www.ccn.com/japan-place-entire-
property-registry-blockchain/, accessed December 4, 2018). 
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Case 1: Georgia 
“The economist Hernando de Soto told us that only one third of all people can prove 
they own their land. Apart from the legal uncertainty, there is $ 20 trillion in dead capital, as 
land with unexplained legal titles cannot be sold. So, we told him, ‘Find us such a country and 
we bring the land register to the Blockchain for free. And that was Georgia.” Marc Taverner, 
BitFury 
Indeed, nowadays merely 15-20 % of the overall land is registered in Georgia39. 
Geographically, Georgia lays between Russia and Turkey while bordering the Black Sea. Its 
population amounts to 3.7 Million citizens and is concentrated mostly around its capital city 
Tbilisi. Historically, Georgia was part of the Soviet Union with small periods of 
independence. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia regained its independence 
which preserved ever since. 
Merely 15 years ago, Georgia found itself on rank 127 out of 133 in the Corruption 
Perception Index, next to Cameroon and Tajikistan (CPI 2003). In 2017 Georgia managed to 
obtain rank 46 out of 180, placing itself next to Spain and Malta (CPI 2017). This is to say 
that reliability, transparency, and integrity of public services were and are pivotal to Georgia’s 
                                                          
- De, N. 2017a. “Indian State Partners With Blockchain Startup for Land Registry Pilot,” CoinDesk, , October 10. 
(https://www.coindesk.com/andhra-pradesh-partners-with-chromaway-to-develop-blockchain-land-registry, accessed November 26, 2018). 
- De, N. 2017b. “Russia’s Government to Test Blockchain Land Registry System,” CoinDesk, , October 20. 
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- Mendes, K. 2018. “Can Blockchain Save the Amazon in Corruption-Mired Brazil?,” Reuters. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-
property-blockchain-idUSKBN1FE113). 
 
39 Graglia, M. 2017. “Tbilisi Agreement Heralds Significant Expansion of Blockchain to Manage Property 
Registries,” New America. (https://www.newamerica.org/future-property-rights/blog/blockchain-for-property-
rights-georgia/, accessed December 4, 2018). 
 
Hanseatic governance - Blockchain as organizational technology 
 
47 
recent efforts which led to a wave of investments and reorganizations that made Georgia a 
progressive country in digitizing public services; due to their efforts, Georgia gained the 4th 
place worldwide in ease for Registering Property40. Despite these efforts, there was still room 
for development, and one of the most promising use cases to be expanded relates to the Land 
Property Rights Management. Associated actors, such as banks, notaries, and Georgia’s 
National Agency of Public Registry (NAPR) are loosely coupled and cannot trace processes 
amongst each other, mistakes occur, and they are costly to correct, also for citizens. 
Furthermore, relating to the spirit of earlier day’s corruption, all NAPR servers are 
centralized, and data can hence (1) easily be modified upon ones liking or, in extreme cases 
(2) destroyed by physical force by misbehaving actors. The control of the Land Property 
Rights Management, and therefore its reliability, is thereby centralized at the state’s level. 
This centralization poses a risk. In the extreme case of an invasion, which is less remotely 
possible than for countries in other circumstances, invaders could overtake the control on land 
titles and alter land ownership without the possibility to retrace changes or even regain its 
original state. This risk is particularly alarming when reviewing Georgia’s political past: The 
last war with Russia (Russo-Georgian War) dates merely ten years back; less than four years 
ago, Russia annexed Crimea, which is only across the Black Sea from Georgia. NAPR 
employees have mentioned all of these as a motivation in their recent effort to build a 
blockchain-based land registry41. However, Georgia cannot make this effort itself. To 
overcome these challenges, especially regarding geopolitical risks, Georgia sought and found 
a solution which we detail below. 
                                                          
40 World Bank. 2018. “Rankings,” World Bank. (http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings, accessed 
December 4, 2018). 
41 Shin, L. 2017. “The First Government To Secure Land Titles On The Bitcoin Blockchain Expands Project,” 
Forbes. (https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/02/07/the-first-government-to-secure-land-titles-on-
the-bitcoin-blockchain-expands-project/, accessed December 4, 2018). 
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In 2016, the NAPR started a project together with Bitfury, a company specialized in 
blockchain platform development, for a blockchain-based land registry. Their primal goals 
have been to digitize and facilitate transacting in registering and transferring land ownership. 
In a first phase, around 1.3 Million paper-based records of land ownership have been digitized 
and imported into a private and permissioned blockchain.42 This phase has been completed 
successfully in 2017. Relying on the digital version of all records, Bitfury implemented a set 
of smart contracts for the process of buying and selling land which aims to replace the 
previously manually conducted authentication processes which regard the second and ongoing 
phase of development. This innovation tackles an important issue: The exchange of money 
and land ownership does not coincide, and parties find themselves waiting months for one or 
the other; in extreme cases, they find out after months of waiting that their request could not 
be processed due to errors. The set of smart contracts aims to synchronize payment and land 
ownership transfer. These payments are thereby also insured by the Georgian National Bank, 
which holds 40-45% of Georgia’s real estate market. The smart contract’s functioning is 
currently piloted and, whenever a transaction is conducted, an entry is made on both the 
concurrent as well as the blockchain system. 
Besides the decrease of transaction costs in the land registry or transfer by avoiding 
costs associated with hiring and dealing with legal authorities, blockchain systems are also 
expected to increase the reliability of records. The main issue, which too often is conflated 
with immutability, is how to certify data quality before it gets on the immutable ledger. In 
Georgia, the NAPR is responsible for data entry to the system, which requires trust in its 
reliability. For the sake of transparency, the NAPR foresees two measures: firstly, it allows 
parties to access the ledger, which contains all historical data, and thereby to control the well-
                                                          
42 Snip, I. 2017. “Georgia: Authorities Use Blockchain Technology for Developing Land Registry | Eurasianet.” 
(https://eurasianet.org/georgia-authorities-use-blockchain-technology-developing-land-registry, accessed 
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functioning of the system (banks, notaries, NGOs, and later also citizens). Secondly, its own 
blockchain is concatenated with another one to implement a backup function: The state of the 
ledger is backed up to the Bitcoin blockchain in the form of a hash at specified points in time 
through a digital time-stamping service.43 This method offers a proof-of-existence and serves 
as a checkpoint to prevents fraudulent tempering of past transactions; the Bitcoin blockchain 
thereby assures a given state of the land registry ledger at a given time. Interestingly enough, 
this may open up a new legal dimension as it may decouple claims on land ownership from its 
local jurisdiction, which may prove helpful when records are in doubt; local authorities would 
not help, Georgia’s system fails to work, or, in extreme cases when the state is overtaken.  
The governance of Georgia’s land registry is organized in collaboration with several 
parties and the NAPR. Although their blockchain system is technically consensus-based, the 
NAPR is leading the effort while holding major decision rights, among other things on system 
design, data authenticity, and access control. This principle is also reflected in the technical 
architecture: Transactions are validated solely by the NAPR, while other parties hold so-
called auditor nodes. As of now, auditor nodes are planned to be given to banks, notaries, as 
well as NGOs – all together, hence, share the oversight of the system (Ziolkowski et al. 2018). 
As the gatekeeper to the system, the NAPR effectively steers the in- and outflow of 
participating actors. The NAPR further can exclude unwanted actors or reverse fraudulent 
transactions, which downplays blockchain’s decentralization principle. Indeed, the NAPR 
imposes its decisions onto others, which is remarkable for blockchain systems which are 
rooted in the rejection of authorities. As major decision rights are centralized at the NAPR’s, 
its governance might point towards a hierarchy, in which transacting agents follow a formal 
                                                          
43 Shin, L. 2016. “Republic Of Georgia To Pilot Land Titling On Blockchain With Economist Hernando De Soto, 
BitFury,” Forbes, , April 21. (http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/04/21/republic-of-georgia-to-pilot-
land-titling-on-blockchain-with-economist-hernando-de-soto-bitfury/, accessed May 18, 2017). 
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line of authority with bureaucratic procedures, which are partly automatized. However, 
auditor nodes allow for a level of transparency, thus accountability to avoid abuses. 
Case 2: Honduras 
Honduras is the second largest country in Central America bordering with Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Nicaragua.44 Its population amounts to 9.2 Million citizens. The overall 
economic situation can be characterized by a high unemployment rate and an unequal 
distribution of income.45 Furthermore, land ownership is distributed unequally with a high 
concentration in a few private hands, while 60% of land titles are left undocumented.46 The 
latter is left to several kinds of disputes, such as conflicts, displacement of indigenous groups, 
and fraudulent appropriation of land (Chavez-Dreyfuss 2015). As an example, an audit 
performed in 2015 by the Honduran government found over 712 irregularities in property 
registrations, 466 of which were of related to fraudulent acts (Collindres et al. 2016). What is 
more, misappropriation of land ownership became common (Benbunan-Fich and Castellanos 
2018; USAID 2018). In a similar vein, merely 15 years ago, Honduras found itself on rank 
107 out of 133. In 2017, Honduras remains on rank 135 out of 180.  
The low percentage of rightful land title coverage is not to say that land ownership 
was unknown but handled rather informally, e.g., via oral agreements (Nelson 2003). It 
became a priority for the government to resolve this issue so landholders could rightfully 
defend their claims. But Honduras’ issues in the land market were rooted deeper: Lack of 
complete land information, uncertain validity of land titles, as well as inefficiencies regarding 
cadastral malfunctions (Benbunan-Fich and Castellanos 2018; Nelson 2003). Conclusively, 
Honduras lacks an integrated land registry; while there are various property registration 
                                                          
44 Nelson, R. T. 2003. Honduras Country Brief: Property Rights And Land Markets, p. 44. 
45 Benbunan-Fich, R., and Castellanos, A. 2018. Digitalization of Land Records: From Paper to Blockchain, p. 9. 
46 Chavez-Dreyfuss, G. 2015. “Honduras to Build Land Title Registry Using Bitcoin Technology,” Reuters. 
(https://in.reuters.com/article/usa-honduras-technology-idINKBN0O01V720150515). 
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offices there is little effort for aggregated views (Nelson 2003). There have been previous 
attempts for land registry improvement by digitizing records and storing them in a centralized 
database. These efforts fell short to several issues, e.g. unauthorized changes due to 
carelessness or corruption or even duplicated land titles (Benbunan-Fich and Castellanos 
2018). From a cost perspective, registering land in Honduras nowadays takes six procedures 
over 22 days with costs approximately 5.7% of the property value (Collindres et al. 2016), 
which places Honduras on rank 95 worldwide in ease for registering property (World Bank 
2018). In consideration of these facts, the idea to modernize the country’s land registry with a 
distributed tamper-proof blockchain database was born. Honduras was among the first-
movers for evaluating a blockchain-based land registry system for their use; the recognition of 
local problems and their efforts to overcome these has been reflected with associated 
publicity, covered inter alia by NASDAQ, Forbes Magazine, and Estrategia y Negocios. The 
Honduran-Factom partnership improved the country’s image worldwide (Collindres et al. 
2016).  
In stark contrast to Georgia’s rather short history of its cadastral system, entries in 
Honduras’ cadastral system date back to the 1880s. This is to say that the reliability of these 
paper-based records is endangered by theft, arson, or misuse (Collindres et al. 2016). 
Consequently, the backup of these entries has been considered a pressing issue. This use-case 
quickly became a central in their line of thought when the Honduran government initiated 
talks in January 2015 about a potential blockchain-based system with Factom, a Texas-based 
blockchain startup (Benbunan-Fich and Castellanos 2018). For another, the blockchain has 
been viewed as an effective means to aid the local judiciary by providing verifiable and 
precise audit trail to hold criminals accountable; this is particularly important as under 
Honduran law, public documents (granted by public institutions) inhere a presumption of 
good faith – they are valid unless stated otherwise (Collindres et al. 2016). As corruption in 
Honduras also has also roots in public institutions, there were few means to come by so far. 
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 It is important to note that these talks followed an amendment of the Honduran 
constitution to decentralize governance, comparable to states within the US. This amendment 
led to the creation of new Zones for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDEs) and 
following its reorganization, common standards had to be developed (Collindres et al. 2016). 
Therefore, in March 2015, representatives of ZEDE as well met with a Committee for the 
Adoption of Best Practices (CAMP) where Factom presented a blockchain-based solution to 
overcome cases of corruptions in the concurrent land registry system. 
Factom’s proposed solution would maintain a layer on top of the Bitcoin blockchain 
with time-stamped records (Lemieux 2016). These records would either represent land 
ownership or land transfer, with proof of existence, proof of process, and proof of audit 
(Lemieux 2016). As with every blockchain implementation, data input is crucial and goes 
beyond Factom’s implementation; Factom’s solution merely preserves what has been given as 
input, e.g., owner of a parcel, parcel size. The entry point of data, hence, must be defined as a 
trusted third party such as a notary, which grants a land title. To record land ownership on the 
blockchain, the land title has to be scanned where meta-data is retrieved and sent to three 
individuals for cross-checking. Upon agreement on the displayed information, the land title is 
forwarded to be stored on-chain – in the case of disagreement, the process returns to land title 
registration (Benbunan-Fich and Castellanos 2018; Lemieux 2016). Putting land title 
registration out of the hands of single entities promises to overcome individual weak links in 
organizations, which may overcome corruption. Land title registration thereby becomes a 
collaborative effort. 
As Benbunan-Fich and Castellanos (2018) found, the negotiations for piloting a 
blockchain-based land registry started shortly after the ZEDE meeting, followed by a signed 
Memorandum of Understanding and a non-binding letter of intent. The pilot was supposed to 
be developed for the fourth largest city La Ceiba. However, ever since project inception, the 
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Honduran Government was reluctant to talk publicly about the initiative, which, as later was 
commented by officials, was due to the release of confidential information to the public. In 
2016, the first news displaying political difficulties in the implementation of the project 
became public (Anand et al. 2016), which was then confirmed by Factom’s CEO (Factom 
2015). The project quickly became controversial among political parties, which caused it to 
stall. It remained stalled during and after the Presidential elections in 2017. 
7. Discussion: Scripta volant, Signata manent 
A Latin proverb declaims: ‘verba volant, scripta manent’. Literally, it translates 
‘spoken words fly away, written words remain’. Since the Romans, information technologies 
changed. So, this proverb needs an update to capture the authenticity that the written word 
used to have before the inflation it suffered in recent decades: ‘scripta volant, signata manent’, 
which means ‘written words fly away, sealed words remain’. 
So far, we argued that the blockchain architecture originated from the need of 
avoiding double-spending, i.e. duplication of data, without putting any formal organization in 
charge of this intermediary authentication. The origin of this decentralized mode of 
authentication followed the process of many other Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) 
projects: a concept is shared publicly (Nakamoto, 2008) and early prototypes are developed 
by volunteers. Despite its beginning, blockchains escape the main tenets of bazaar mode of 
organizing, which is rooted into FOSS. This motivated us to: a) spot the differences, b) show 
exemplar cases of governance difficulties of major blockchains, c) describe how consortia-
based blockchain are circumventing those difficulties. Throughout the rest of this document, 
those differences are discussed against established conceptualizations of governance. 
Information infrastructures opened up for a very successful mode of governance of 
which FOSS and Wikipedia are glaring examples. Their ‘bazaar’ mode of governance relies 
upon licenses that protect the nearly zero marginal cost of reproduction and distribution of 
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information goods. As a consequence, those information goods are non-exclusive because 
one’s use does not exclude anyone else’s. While the prominence of free participation and 
reputation above other rewarding mechanisms have been pinpointed, little has been put 
forward regarding how this way of governing innovation has favored the emergence of the 
contemporary IT oligopoly, to the extent it relies on free access to software and data.  
Against this background, our research problem has been that the ‘bazaar’ does not 
explain essential peculiarities of blockchain as an organizational technology. Lustig and Nardi 
(2015b) pose special attention onto algorithms as defining aspect of Bitcoin, whereas we 
argue that ledger’s maintainers and tokens’ users characterize the governance of blockchain as 
much as the stakeholders it affects. Indeed, beyond software development, the authenticity of 
the ledger is what maintainers guarantee and users rely upon. Authenticity is not a straight 
product of algorithms (incidentally, it should be noted that many previous digital certificates 
were technically sound) but a sustained long-term effort that all involved parties contribute to 
and depend upon. Beyond software developers, miners (or whoever maintains the ledger) and 
traders (or whoever uses the tokens for the most diverse purposes) gained a prominent role in 
governance. 
In other words, blockchains authenticate each item from any copies, which would not 
be all the same any more. Each item is unique, therefore ‘exclusive’ (i.e. one’s use prevents 
others’). Blockchains achieve that through distributed consensus, which needs cooperation of 
the majority of participants and generates scarcity of the items it authenticates. In turn, 
scarcity triggers rivalry between actors longing for a limited number of tokens. The 
consequences of this peculiar arrangement balancing cooperation and competition are evident 
by considering the consequences of forking a blockchain. The new ‘forked’ ledger may use 
the same software, but the authenticity and value of the items it records is not the same. We 
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have illustrated those problems and rationales through examples of actual forks of the major 
blockchains in existence: Bitcoin and Ethereum. 
Even though they remain the biggest and possibly most influential ones, 
permissionless blockchains have been battered by substantial governance problems, which 
have hampered them. The need of more effective governance might take the shape of more 
sophisticated blockchains that predefine the rules of future changes, so to avoid the kind of 
conflicts demonstrated by Bitcoin block size conflicts and DAO reversal. These efforts rely 
on so-called ‘on-chain’ governance. Even if in principle they are possible, little has happened 
in practice, yet. So, we have focused on the alternative, which is consortia-based blockchains. 
Coalitions of actors, rather than trying to foresee future situations, then designing possibly 
suitable modes of governance based on incentives and algorithms, retain a certain level of ad-
hoc decision-making powers. This discretionary power, coupled with the reliance on the 
existing institutional context, allows them to cope with the inevitable unpredictability of 
future situations.  
This mode of governance, which we call ‘hanseatic’ is characterized by: 
a) partial delegation of typical organizational functions like consensus and 
authentication to technology, 
b) need to anticipate and negotiate early on in the consortium building and 
development process the known, and possibly unknown, scenarios ahead of the initiative, 
c) traceability and reliability of the records, especially when they exceed specific 
organizational domain or jurisdiction. 
To introduce those characteristics more in detail, we first need to discuss our cases 
against established conceptualizations. 
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Both FOSS and blockchains rely on a higher level of publicity of actions compared to 
more traditional modes of organizing like hierarchies or markets (Williamson, 1975). FOSS 
keeps the software code public to improve its quality while minimizing transaction costs. The 
centrality of copyleft as a peculiar kind of contract and the focus on transaction cost are 
insufficient to explain how blockchains relate to the public and use openness. In particular, a 
certain rivalry among participants coupled to trust in the reliability of the system as a whole 
(forking is more damaging than in normal FOSS projects) are more prominent. Interestingly, 
this reminds of Simmel’s definition of money as ‘a claim upon society’. Let us leave aside, 
for the time being, what ‘society’ stands for here. Actors in bazaars and blockchains gain the 
capacity of making claims in very distinct ways: in bazaars reputation is of paramount 
relevance whereas blockchains provide a less disputable a more scalable anchor: tokens which 
can stand for something else, and cannot be tempered with. So, legitimacy of its mode of 
authentication is central.  
Blockchain mode of authentication marks a central difference from FOSS. FOSS and 
blockchain may share origins in the creative ways of CBPP, but the value of an authenticated 
token depends on more than software. Miners and users, as all cases showed, have a heavier 
weight than in FOSS when it comes to give legitimacy of what is on a blockchain and its 
value. Anyone can run a Bitcoin software, but only nodes on the main blockchain can trade on 
that price (or other values for different applications). The others do not enjoy the same level 
of trust and legitimacy. More precisely:  
• While in FOSS projects the majority cannot enforce its decisions onto 
everyone, because anyone can fork their own version relying on publicly available code at 
low cost while preserving their own use value, in blockchain matters majority decisions are 
enforced and forking poses substantial costs on all users; 
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• Contrary to open source licenses that prevent anyone from appropriating the 
‘matter of trade’ (i.e. software code), public ledgers introduce authentication thus scarcity into 
digital settings. Traceability of all actions on the ledger act as a deterrent from breaking the 
rules. So, blockchain move from ‘carrots and rainbows’ (von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth, & 
Wallin, 2012) as main incentives, to a ‘gentle rivalry’ (Ziolkowski, Parangi, Miscione, & 
Schwabe, 2018); 
• Cryptocurrencies or other built-in blockchain rewarding schemes affect 
people’s involvement not least because they trade and hoard tokens. This is not a feature of 
other FOSS projects, more reliant on reputation; 
The uncertainty about tomorrow puts more pressure on what is done today because 
forking later on would be troublesome. In front of this condition, governance on-chain tries to 
put the future on the tracks that can be imagined today through allegedly complete smart-
contracts. Consortia-based projects do not rely on these, but rely on arrangements according 
to which all partners are on the same boat and have ‘skin in the game’. Durkheim argued that 
wherever a contract exists, it is subject to regulation, which is the work of society and not 
only of individuals; 
• Derived from the previous points, blockchains manifest a level of mutually 
dependent interest, thus organizational togetherness, that the bazaar metaphor does not 
capture. While we maintain that digital modes of governance present substantial differences 
from previous ones like markets and hierarchies, we find the bazaar emphasis on software 
reductive. The focus on FOSS as main reference for the bazaar governance is limiting because 
it overemphasizes the production and development of software over its deployments, actual 
usages and drifts in practice, and undeniable influence that maintainers like miners exercise. 
Because of their function as long-term immutable ledgers, blockchains cannot be designed, 
Miscione, Goerke, Klein, Schwabe, Ziolkowski 
58 
deployed, maintained, and certainly not understood without considering their actual use and 
the tensions they generate in real-life settings.  
More concretely, like any other FOSS project, the source code of most blockchain 
software is publicly available for anyone to check, use, develop and redistribute it. In spite of 
these apparent similarities, there are remarkable differences between open-source applications 
like web browsers or word processors and blockchains, which makes them organizational 
technologies. Cryptocurrencies, by authenticating some tokens against the rest, introduce 
exclusivity into the digital environment, which has always been characterized by infinite 
replicability, thus plentitude. Records on distributed ledgers even when run by pseudonymous 
actors, are more trustworthy and reliable than what can be published on pseudonymous blogs. 
In short, before the blockchain, all copies were the same. With blockchain it has become 
possible to differentiate something from something else (like who owns a bitcoin) without 
relying on external authorities. 
On open networks like the internet, both innovations and deviance come from the 
fringes. Since there is no way to seal boundaries to define who is in and who is out of open 
infrastructures, then to control them, the permissionless blockchains of our cases are 
constantly exposed to malicious actors and undesired outcomes. So, openness is generative 
both of innovations and misconducts (Zittrain, 2006). 
It has to be reminded that an increased shared interest and togetherness does not come 
without tensions. Rather the opposite: conflicts in FOSS appear to be among tree-huggers 
compared to all possible means deployed in Bitcoin conflicts. The radicalization and even 
dishonesty that developed among involved Bitcoin factions led to incomplete or discordant 
forks. First, the evident loss of network effects that inherently accompanies these splits has to 
be noted: since Bitcoins attached to one chain cannot be traded any longer on the other. So, its 
overall use value depends on smaller mining capacity, trade volume, and user base. Beyond 
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that, the overall credibility of immutable ledgers has been severely undermined. In sum, 
Bitcoin block size and DAO conflicts illustrate the other side of trust and togetherness. In 
sum, it is essential not only not to overlook the role of trust in blockchains, but also not to 
overlook that trust building is not necessarily an idyllic process. What comes up clearly is that 
there can be no self-governance or self-sustainability solely relying on technology. 
Blockchains remain socio-technical systems, which are embedded into a broader institutional 
context even when they invent novel organizational forms.47  
7.1. Hanseatic League 
Hirschman (1970) articulated the three choices actors have to respond to declining 
organizations: loyalty, voice, or exit. Loyalty has been greatly diminished by the (allure of) 
wealth of opportunities that open networks prospect. Voice, i.e. the possibility of expressing 
diverging views, has also been enhanced by the wide availability of publishing tools to reach 
a potentially global audience. Changes in the possibility of exit, i.e. fork in these cases, is 
essential when comparing the bazaar to the mode of governance that blockchains enact. 
Referring to this threefold conceptualization and closing up to the details of a comparison 
between bazaar and our cases, one can see that loyalty is very low in FOSS, which tends to be 
promiscuous (“release early, release often, delegate everything you can, be open to the point 
of promiscuity” (Raymond, 1999)), whereas both permissionless and permissioned 
blockchains tend to be more ‘sticky’. Probably because of a higher pressure to stay together in 
blockchains, voices tend to be much louder. Hardly ever a spat about Linux kernel 
technicalities hit the general press headlines, even if it runs billion of devices. The drama of 
crypto is often depicted as a never-ending saga for the global audience. Exit/fork and the 
disruption it entails for distributed ledgers, as argued above, mark the main difference 
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between bazaar organizing and the cases considered here. The following table summarizes the 
differences. 
 Bazaar Blockchains 
Loyalty Very low, to the level of 
promiscuity 
Defined by its architecture 
Voice Community maintenance is 
important but dissent is hardly 
threatening   
Very animated because interests are 
shared 
Exit Easy forks Quite detrimental internally, generate a 
drop in credibility 
 
Referring back to the DAO offers a good illustration of blockchains ‘stickiness’. DAO 
miners were ‘willing to sacrifice a week’s mining revenue should [they] prove to be on the 
wrong side of the fork’48 and thus were to follow outcomes that contradicted their 
preferences. This togetherness is peculiar of this case and blockchain applications. Ultimately, 
the Ethereum community remained relatively tight despite Ethereum Classic fork and the 
dissent that was voiced before and after it. It has to be noted that the voting process was not 
democratic in the sense of ‘one head, one vote’. Only miners had the right to vote, which one 
user saw as evidence that ‘Ethereum [would] never be free of miner consensus’. This clarifies 
the violation of FOSS characteristic 'separation of governance from property', thus 
blockchain's distinction from CBPP. What was at stake, and probably not very evident to 
these inward-looking communities, is that the totem of immutability, in which blockchains 
find their raison d'être, is rooted in the taboo of not forking. By deciding to fork to counteract 
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an unintended use of their smart contact, the Ethereum community broke the foundational 
value they themselves had put at the core of their own technology. This is how they lost their 
innocence. 
These reasons prompted us to name this peculiar governance mode. After considering 
several alternatives, we decided to name the mode of governance emerging from blockchain 
domain ‘hanseatic’, in reference to the Hanseatic League of the 13th to 16th century, before the 
consolidation of modern nation-states in Europe. Then, trade guilds across many cities 
spanning from nowadays Holland to the Baltic countries formed an alliance that proved 
hegemonic in Northern Europe trade through the North and Baltic seas. We find this analogy 
appropriate to suit our cases for three main reasons that correspond to three distinct 
disciplinary backgrounds: 
1. It is an historic period that falls the constant fights of feudalism and pre-dates 
the establishment of the Rule of Law. Trust and alliances had a prominent role 
in regulating organizations and society even if rudimentary parliamentary 
assembly met sporadically: 
2. During that centuries-long window, rival cities agreed to cooperate in order to 
foster their own commerce against other trade powers thought the established 
tariffs and trade rules; 
3. Over those centuries, this alliance provided aids for safe navigation (including 
lighthouses and safe harbors), and defended its members from the constant 
threats of pirates. It even had its own army, albeit rarely deployed.  
The Hanseatic League’s favor for orderly trade over conflicts resulted in a long period 
of prosperity and peace. It is suitable to underline that this coalition was relatively fluid both 
because of members joining and leaving over time, and because of resemblances and common 
interests between member cities were not undermining their independence.  
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Reasons for referring to the Hanseatic League are that it used to have its own mode of 
governance which was heavily relying on trust rather than defined by an overall constitutional 
framework like modern national democracies. Also, its territory of influence was not set once 
for all, so exit was an option that some cities exercised sometimes over the centuries. Another 
reason to adopt this metaphor is the role of the guilds, professional associations that 
influenced the league’s decisions, similarly to expert organizations having a more prominent 
role in consortia-based blockchains. Needless to say, compromised or just unreliable records 
because left to particular self-interests would turn highly problematic for example when land 
property authentication rely on them. In short, trust needs to be built far beyond software 
itself and its code availability. Within state jurisdictions, notaries and state officers are in 
charge of guaranteeing reliability. When the Rule of Law applies patchily, like in the Bitcoin 
and Ethereum cases, the questions of liability raise up: if there are no clear accountability 
lines, who is liable when something goes wrong? The awareness of those risks manifests 
indirectly also in the other cases above. For instance, the Georgia case sees a blockchain 
linked to Bitcoin -by far the most reliable blockchain because its size and track record- and 
state records. However, this induces conflicts between modes of governance: trust in the 
Hansa may not align with trust in the state (or hierarchy). If in 20 years an immutable 
blockchain records a different owner for a piece of land than an old paper certificate, what 
would a judge trust? What has legal standing? This remain open questions for the time being. 
What matters to stress here is that our reference to the Hanseatic League remains at a 
metaphorical rather than a blueprint. 
7.2. Blockchains as organizational technologies 
Information technologies have been changing how things get organized for a while 
now. Peer-to-peer networks, cloud computing, just to name a few waves of digital innovation, 
are instances of a mode of organizing which has been: a) circumventing the structures and 
conventions of formal organizations, and b) changing and disrupting markets while opening 
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new ones. Those changes are well epitomized by FOSS, its bazaar organizing and commons-
based peer production. The most recent trend of digital innovation is blockchain, and comes 
from the same cultural milieu. However, it embeds functions that used to be domain of 
organizations: consensus and authentication. Cryptocurrencies proved at scale the feasibility 
of an architecture that certifies each token on a network and differentiates it from all others. 
All copies are the same no more. This newly created scarcity originates both cooperation to 
keep the system running reliably, and rivalry between actors longing for a finite number of 
tokens. Thus, blockchain mode of governance is peculiar, which we likened to the Hanseatic 
League for the prominence given to trust within an alliance rather than stringent hierarchies, 
where blockchains would be useless, or widely fluctuating markets, where cryptocurrencies 
governance showed all its shortcomings. Application domains like second-hand cars markets 
and land registries showed how this technology is not just about transmitting information, but 
it embeds organizational functions that redefine the possibilities for loyalty, voice, and exit. 
Thus, the overall organizational behavior. 
Looking forward, it is impossible to avoid some level of speculation. Still, speculation 
about the future may say something about how things are perceived today. When money – or 
any kind of certain record for that matter – was not available, online organizing could be 
based on a gift economy like FOSS or Wikipedia, or had to rely on credit money that 
commercial banks keep pegged to fiat (i.e. state) money. Natively digital reliable records 
prospect an alternative that, for the time being, has been mainly tested for illegal trades. This 
is not new, major digital innovations, from videorecorders to digital music, found their origins 
in the gray area between legality and deviance. Indeed, social and organizational changes 
originate before this distinction crystallize. 
In any case we should not be deterministic in assuming what behaviors and 
institutional context decentralized architectures imply and require. Agre (2003), referring to 
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the previous wave of peer-to-peer architectures originated with file sharing, instils the 
reasonable doubt that decentralized architectures do not necessarily match with decentralized 
institutions and vice versa. Especially, decentralization may not necessarily lead to equality in 
practice. In fact, most open projects (like the Web, Wikipedia, P2P, FOSS) showed 
remarkable tendencies to centralization over time (for instance (O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007). 
This is certainly possible for blockchain and, for instance, Bitcoin mining shows a clear 
centralization in China where estimates place 2/3 of computing power. Consortia-based 
blockchain may follow the same route but at least, since not all governance tools are inscribed 
on-chain a priori, partners can still decide the fate of their own partnership. 
Long-term consequences in governance remain largely unpredictable, especially 
where state authorities cannot be taken for granted. In prospect, reliable records are promising 
in low trust environments, like where states are weak or absent. This means that, if successful, 
blockchains and states may be on a collision trajectory unless they partner. The modes this 
may happen would promising research avenues. 
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